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 This Article explains two related functions served by the standing in 
public law. Standing has been subject to voluminous1 and sustained 
criticism over the past forty years.2 Indeed, articles on standing routinely 
                                                 
1 Louis Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1971) (describing literature as 
“enormous”). 
2 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 390 (3rd ed. 2000), 
[hereinafter, TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (“[T]he law of standing has for some time been 
the one of most criticized aspects of constitutional law.”); ERVIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 60 (3rd ed. 2006) (observing that 
standing is apparently “incoherent,” and “frequently attacked” in an “extensive” corpus of 
scholarship).  See also, Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.  612 
(2004) [hereinafter, Staudt, Modeling] (noting “countless” analyses of standing). See, e.g., 
See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 88-103 (1991); 
Stephen L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988); William Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L. J. 221 
(1998); David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 
1984 WISC. L. REV. 37; Abraham Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1982) (describing standing as “incoherent or inappropriate, or both”); 
Jaffe; articles cited in notes 3-6. 
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begin with a recitation of subject’s vast “comment, criticism, and doctrinal 
confusion.”3 Scholars almost unanimously4 regard the doctrine as pointless 
and incoherent at best,5 a veil for ideological manipulations at worst.6 Prof. 
Tushnet summarized the more charitable view: standing law “serves no 
useful purpose.”7 In the view that has “acquired the status of folk wisdom,” 
standing decisions are simply “concealed judgments on the merits” made 
without the benefit of a full factual record.8 Not  surprisingly, many leading 
scholars call for significantly liberalizing or even abolishing it.9 Academic 
disillusionment with standing has accompanied, or encouraged, dwindling 
enthusiasm on the Court, which has somewhat loosened standing 
restrictions over the last several decades.10 
Unlike almost all previous scholarship, this Article applies economic 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Staudt, Modeling at 613-14. 
4 See id. For some rare exceptions, see Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As an 
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983) 
[hereinafter Scalia, Separation of Powers]; Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article 
III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 307-
09 (1979) (arguing that standing promotes individual autonomy) [hereinafter Brilmayer, 
“Case or Controversy”]; articles cited in n.33. 
5 See Fletcher (“[S]tanding law . . . has long been criticized as incoherent.”). 
6 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N. Carol. L. Rev. 1741, 1786 
(1999): 
Modern standing law is closer to a part of the political system than to a part of 
the legal system. It is characterized by numerous malleable doctrines and 
numerous inconsistent precedents. Judges regularly manipulate the doctrines and 
rely on selective citation of precedents to further their own political preferences. 
7 Mark V. Tushnet, The “Case Or Controversy” Controversy: The Sociology of Article 
III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1705 (1980). 
8 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies – And 
Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 U. VA. L. REV. 632, 635 (2006). 
9 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 216-17 (1993) 
(arguing against standing limitations for constitutional challenge to government action); 
Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article 
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 167 (1992) [hereinafter, Sunstein, Citizen Suits] (“the very 
notion of an ‘injury-in-fact is not merely a misinterpretation of . . . Article III but also a 
large-scale conceptual mistake” equivalent to early twentieth-century substantive due 
process); Fletcher, supra, at 223 (urging courts to “abandon” standing requirements); 
David R. Dow, Standing and Rights, 36 Emory L. J. 1195 (1987); Gene Nichol, Jr., 
Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 650 (1985); 
Mark Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 
663 (1977). 
10 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 195 
(1996); Jensen, et. al., at 209 (noting that “there is virtual unanimity” that the Supreme 
Court liberalized standing doctrine in the 1960s and 1970s). See Pierce, at 1788-89 
(arguing that Akins represent a major liberalization of standing doctrine); Cass Sunstein, 
Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. 
REV. 613, 645 (1999) (same).  
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analysis to the standing doctrine to show that it can prevent inefficient 
dispositions of constitutional entitlements. In a distinct but related point, 
standing protects peoples’ ability to individually determine the best use of 
their rights. Thus contrary to conventional wisdom, standing has significant, 
autonomous, and public-regarding functions. The analysis presented here 
also helps explain many of the mysteries of standing: Why should inchoate 
injuries be less justiciable than tangible ones? Isn’t it paradoxical that 
justiciability exists when a few people are harmed, but not when a great 
many are harmed? Why should standing be a greater barrier when plaintiffs 
allege violations of the structural constitution rather than individual rights 
provisions, given that the restrictions of the former ultimately exist to 
protect individuals? 
The next few paragraphs will briefly sketch the functions of standing 
elaborated in this Article. Then the limits, scope and structure of the Article 
will be discussed.  
In the ordinary course of events, constitutional rights can be waived or 
bargained away by their individual bearers, in keeping with a broader legal 
culture that values litigant autonomy and favors the alienability of causes of 
action. The alienability of rights is crucial to their being put to their highest-
value use. For example, a newspaper editor has a First Amendment right to 
be free of censorship. She is approached by Pentagon officials and told that 
the publication of a certain story will hurt national security. The editor can 
seek an injunction against prior restraint – or she can waive this right by 
voluntarily spiking the story. She can do this for the publicly-minded 
reasons like national security, or entirely selfish ones like good relations 
with potential Pentagon sources. Normally, decisions about the optimal use 
of rights are made separately and discretely by disparate individuals, and 
alienating their entitlement is one of the potential uses. 
Sometimes circumstances make individual rights effectively inalienable 
– not as a result of any explicit policy choice, but simply because of the 
transaction cost structure of the situation. This happens when a single 
governmental action infringes on the rights of many people with conflicting 
preferences about how and whether to use their rights. In this situation, 
when one person seeks injunctive relief, his exercise of his rights effectively 
determines the exercise of the individual rights of everyone in the affected 
class. Massive social welfare losses can result in such circumstances. It is 
impossible to negotiate an efficient solution with a single rights-holder 
because anyone in a large and open class can be that single  person. Thus 
every individual rights-holder, in the absence of standing restrictions, would 
have veto power over a government action that affects the rights of many, 
making strategic holdout likely. Standing allows courts to bypass the 
problems of high transaction costs and strategic behavior by attempting to 
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replicate the outcome that would be reached in a low-transaction cost 
environment – the outcome in the sense of whether the government action 
proceeds or not.  
 
This Article shows that standing has important purposes not revealed by 
current understandings of the doctrine. But recognizing the economic and 
rights-protecting functions of standing is crucial for an assessment of 
proposals to liberalize the doctrine. Such suggestions must take into account 
the potentially large social welfare costs and individual-rights interference 
that would exist in the absence of standing restrictions. Moreover, the 
economic approach to standing helps define clearly the situations in which 
standing problems arise. This may promote a more coherent application of 
the doctrine, as well as providing a basis for functional criticism of its 
misapplication.  
This only amounts to an explanation, rather than endorsement of 
standing doctrine. While standing solves real social problems, it is not a 
costless solution. The costs include the delay or preclusion of judicial 
review of illegal government activity and the foregone production of 
precedent. Whether these costs exceed the benefits are questions separate 
and subsequent to understanding the problems to which standing responds. 
While this Article shows that standing may serve useful purposes, the 
doctrine’s legitimate functions do not rule out illegitimate ones. Like any 
other doctrine requiring judgment and discretion, standing can be 
incorrectly applied or purposefully abused. This Article does not claim to 
explain the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence, which is largely but 
not entirely consistent with the functional account presented here. At the 
same time, the fact that standing serves the functions described here does 
not mean it does not have any other potentially beneficial functions.11 
 
This Article confines its analysis to the central component of the Art. III 
standing doctrine – the requirement of a justiciable injury, also known as an 
“injury-in-fact.” The role of standing described here is performed solely 
through the injury component (which is also the most controversial). 
Furthermore, it focuses on standing to assert constitutional rather than 
statutory rights, which both courts and scholars suggest involve somewhat 
different considerations. While much of the analysis applies equally to 
                                                 
11 For example, Maxwell Stearns has made an important contribution to the literature 
by showing that standing prevents the manipulation of intransitive preferences on the Court 
by strategic litigants. See Maxwell Stearns, Standing Back From the Forest: Justiciability 
and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 n. 58 (1995) [hereinafter Stearns, Standing 
Back]; Maxwell Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PENN. 
L. REV. 309, 309 (1995) [hereinafter Stearns, Historical Evidence]. 
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congressionally-created rights, there are important normative differences 
which will be explored briefly.12  
A major criticism of standing doctrine is that there is no intelligible role 
for the doctrine beyond determining whether substantive law gives the 
plaintiff a cause of action.13 In this view, treating the doctrine as 
jurisdictional obscures the real issue, which is simply about the scope of 
rights protected by the substantive law. When a plaintiff does not have a 
legally protected right at stake, standing gets the right result through the 
wrong reasoning. When substantive law does give the plaintiff a legally 
protected right and it is violated, refusing to recognize standing because the 
right is broadly held or inchoate is simply a refusal to give effect to the 
governing law. In this view, if the substantive law gives the plaintiff the 
right to sue, that is the end of the matter.  
This Article agrees with the critics that standing should not be used as a 
proxy for the existence of a legally protected right. It parts company from 
them in identifying a separate, autonomous and socially valuable function 
for the doctrine. This function can only be seen precisely in those cases 
where the individual plaintiff has a judicially-protected entitlement. Thus 
throughout the Article, it will be assumed that all plaintiffs and potential 
plaintiffs have a cause of action. Holding constant the cause of action issue 
is necessary to isolating the independent function of the standing doctrine. 
It will be further assumed that all plaintiffs have meritorious claims -- 
that the challenged government conduct violates their rights. This further 
removes any confusion between standing and merits questions by taking 
plaintiffs’ claims as true. Because standing determinations are made at the 
pleading stage, courts must construe the substantive claims as favorably to 
the plaintiff as possible. Again, standing’s independent role can only be 
seen when one holds constant other elements of the case. 
Any particular standing regime can fall on a spectrum from restrictive, 
where potentially no one can challenge certain wrongs, to permissive, 
where almost anyone can sue. For ease of exposition, this Article will use 
terms like narrow or restrictive standing to refer to the former conception, 
and liberal or broad standing to refer to the latter version. The most liberal 
approach to standing rules can also be described as simply a lack of 
standing barriers. Thus when this Article speaks simply of standing, it refers 
the robust, restrictive vision of the doctrine.  
 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly sketches the standing 
doctrine and particularly the injury requirement. It discusses efforts to 
                                                 
12 See Part V.D. 
13 See Stearns, Standing Back at n.58 (observing that the cause-of-action theory is 
dominant among scholars). See, e.g., sources cited at note 32, infra.   
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understand the purpose of standing restrictions, and the major criticisms of 
the existing rationales. The two major functions of standing are presented in 
Parts II and III respectively. Part II sets out the transaction-cost function of 
standing and it shows how it  is entirely different from the dominant 
accounts of the doctrine. 
The economic approach may neglect the broader social purposes of 
rights by focusing solely on their transactional value. Moreover, some 
would contend that speaking of rights in welfarist terms is nonsensical, as 
rights cannot be reduced to instrumental arithmetic. These objections are 
taken up from Part II.E through Part III. Part III also presents the second, 
non-economic function that standing plays – protecting individual 
autonomy over the exercise of their rights, an autonomy that is threatened 
when rights overlap.  
Part IV considers whether the function of standing can be better served 
through other means. It concludes that while various expedients would 
solve some of the problems to which standing responds, none would solve 
all of them, and the solutions would themselves have significant drawbacks. 
All of this may explain why courts in fact use the standing doctrine. Part V 
ties up some loose ends, such as why these functions of standing will never 
be implicated in Equal Protection challenges, and the applicability of the 
analysis to standing under congressionally-created rights. 
 
I.  THE DOCTRINE AND THE CRITICS  
 
A.  Constitutional basis. 
 Article III of the Constitution enumerates the three types of “Cases” 
and six types of “Controversies” that fall within the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.14 Not only must suits fall within one of the nine categories to 
be heard by Art. III courts, they must also be presented in the proper 
package – a case or controversy.15 On one level, this seems natural. Courts 
resolve cases, not philosophical disputes, beauty contests, or broad 
questions of foreign policy.16 The “case” is to the courts what the “bill” is to 
Congress – the basic unit of operation. However, specifying the outer 
bounds of a “case or controversy” proves exceedingly difficult.  
                                                 
14 U.S. CONST., ART. III. § 2. 
15 The extent to which standing and related rules truly stem from the express or 
implicit command of Article III has been a subject of some debate. Compare Sunstein, 
Citizen Suits, 91 MICH. L. REV. at 169 (arguing standing is a 20th century invention with 
value-laden goals), with Caleb Nelson & Anne Woolhander, Does History Defeat Standing 
Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004) (defending historical basis of standing). 
16 See Letter of John Jay to Alexander Hamilton, reprinted in RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., 
DANIEL MELTZER, AND DAVID L. SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 79-81 (5th ed. 2004). 
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The various Article III justiciability doctrines – standing, ripeness, 
mootness, political question, advisory opinions – all try to define the 
contours of the case-or-controversy limitation. Standing, the “most 
important of these doctrines,”17 focuses on whether a plaintiff is the right 
person to bring a given issue before the court. This is what makes standing 
jurisdictional – the inquiry is not about the existence of a wrong, but 
whether the court can respond at the request of this plaintiff.  
The Court has framed the standing inquiry as having three components: 
whether the plaintiff alleges a “injury in fact,” whether that alleged injury 
can “fairly be traced to the challenged action,” and finally, whether a 
favorable ruling would probably end the injury.18 (Beyond this 
constitutional “core” of standing, there are also “prudential” standing rules 
invented by the courts themselves; Congress can presumably override these 
“self-imposed restraints.”19 This Article analyzes only the Art. III 
limitations on standing.)  
 
B.  Defining an Injury.  
The standing inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff has a justiciable 
injury, or an “injury-in-fact.” The Court itself has admitted that the concept 
is “not susceptible of precise definition.”20 and most commentators amplify 
that view. 21 Still, some basic concerns can be teased out. One concern is the 
avoidance of “abstract” injuries. Standing demands that courts respond only 
to “distinct and palpable” harms. This limitation most often has bite in 
ideological litigation by public interest groups, or when the alleged conduct 
causes inchoate harms, such as stigma. Related to abstractness is a concern 
about “general” rather than “particular” injuries. When government action 
harms many a great many people in the same way, none will have standing 
to assert the “undifferentiated” injury. In such cases, the Court will say that 
redress for the constitutional violation can only be had through the political 
branches – a position man see as an abdication of judicial review.  
None of these attempts to define standing have been convincing, even to 
                                                 
17 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
18 See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). 
19 See Allen v. Wright. The main prudential rule prevents litigants from asserting the 
rights of others (jus tertii). See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).  
20 Allen v. Wright. 
21 A quarter-century ago, it was already “customary in writing on standing to war the 
reader” of its amorphous character. Karen Orren, Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict 
in the Federal Courts, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 723 n.1 (1979), citing Paul Freund, Hearings 
Before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 89th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1966), pt. 
2, pg. 498 (describing standing as “among the most amorphous” doctrines “in the entire 
domain of public law”). 
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the Court.22 The abstractness argument is used to rebuff groups with a 
programmatic or ideological interest in the constitutional violation. It is true 
that their sense of injury is a “psychological consequences . . . produced by 
observation of conduct with which one disagrees.”23 But if the conduct also 
violates the plaintiff’s constitutional rights – the merits question – it is hard 
to see why psychological injury in insufficient. Certainly psychological 
harms are treated as concrete and justiciable in many ordinary tort contexts, 
such as negligent infliction of emotional distress and defamation. Indeed, if 
everyone’s rights are violated, and only some are offended (due to differing 
ideological views), this seems no different from an “egg-shell skull” 
situation, where a particular precondition of the plaintiff (such as a concern 
for the environment) makes him more prone to suffer severe harm from an 
otherwise de minimus injury.  
Denying standing because the injury is too “general” or 
“undifferentiated” begs the question. Usually when a single course of 
governmental conduct violates the rights of many people, all can sue.24 This 
is true even if each person’s injury is identical, as is the case with most 
large-scale instances of racial discrimination. Yet the Court has gone so far 
as to suggest that when a constitutional violation violates the rights of all 
citizens, none have standing.25 
 
C.  Purposes and criticisms. 
Two related purposes are commonly adduced for the standing doctrine. 
Standing is often said to tracks the purposes of the rule against advisory 
opinions – to ensure a concrete, adversary presentation of the issues.26 The 
“abstract” injury shunned by standing doctrine may lead to an “abstract” 
presentation of the issues involved, while courts do best at incremental, 
fact-specific determinations. And a plaintiff without a true Article III 
“injury-in-fact” may not have enough on the line to invest the right amount 
of resources in the case and fully inform the court of the consequences of an 
adverse ruling.  
                                                 
22 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475. 
23 Valley Forge at 485. 
24 See JAMES P. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 34 (2006), (observing 
that wrongful conduct often inflicts cognizable injuries on large classes of people); DAVID 
P. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 26 (4th ed. 1999) (“It hardly seems an 
appropriate reason for denying relief. . . that the Government has harmed many citizens 
rather than only a few.”) 
25 See Reservists Committee at 227. 
26 See generally, Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class 
Actions, the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory 
Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545 (2006) (arguing that Art. III case or controversy 
requirement demands genuine adversity between parties). 
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Few find these justifications convincing. In particular, scholars argue 
that the concept of “injury-in-fact” does not capture the degree of 
concreteness or adversity in litigation.27 The injury requirement mostly bars 
ideological or “public interest” plaintiffs. However, these are often 
represented by well-financed, skilled and committed organizations. 
Ideological plaintiffs may in fact care much more than anyone else about 
the question.28 Nor does it appear that the attorneys for such plaintiffs fail to 
raise relevant considerations sharply enough.29 Which is just another way of 
saying ideological injuries are real rather than abstract, and indeed, any 
injuries that prompt the plaintiff to invest in litigation are real (especially 
given that the relief sought is often purely injunctive).30 As Judge Fletcher 
famously wrote, to say that a plaintiff who feels injured does not have a 
cognizable injury is to call him a liar. Surely courts should not address an 
issue sua sponte, but the initiation of an action by a private party who is 
sincerely aggrieved should be enough to remove the non-adversity/advisory 
opinion concerns.     
More recently, the Court has begun to argue that standing supports the 
separation of powers, in particular between the judiciary and the executive. 
The latter is charged with ensuring the laws are “faithfully executed” by the 
government. Given limited resources, this necessarily entails some degree 
of discretion. If anyone can challenge the legality of government action, it 
may curtail or interfere with the President’s “Take Care” power.31 This 
argument is much stronger in the context of congressionally-conferred 
standing, which might be a legislative end-run around executive 
management and enforcement of statutes. The Court also says standing 
                                                 
27 See Fletcher at 247048; Amar, supra note __, at 719 n. 154 (arguing that “any 
legitimate interest in guaranteeing adverse presentation of issues can easily be handled” 
without the standing doctrine). 
28 See Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending – The Role of Legal and Equitable 
Principles, 4 CHAPMAN L. REV. 1, 46-47 (2001) (“[I]deological plaintiffs . . . will address 
the issues of principle raised in litigation precisely because they care as much about the 
structure of American government independent of the impact of their own pocketbooks.”); 
Landes & Posner at __. 
29 See Epstein at 46; Loius L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The 
Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PENN. L. REV. 1033, 1037-38 (1968): 
[Investing money in a lawsuit from which one is to acquire no further monetary 
profit argues . .  a quite exceptional kind of interest . . . From this I would 
conclude that, insofar as the argument for a traditional plaintiff runs in terms of 
the need for effective advocacy, the argument is not persuasive. 
30 See Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court -- A Functional Analysis, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 645, 674 (1973) (“If plaintiff did not have the minimal personal 
involvement and adverseness which Article III requires, he would not be engaging in the 
costly pursuit of litigation.”). 
31 See Scalia. 
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protects the separation of powers in a broader sense, by preventing judges 
from sitting as a Council or Revision. But this is simply a restatement of the 
advisory opinion concern. 
Given the doctrinal incoherence, it is not surprising the entire Art. III 
standing inquiry has been assailed by commentators. The purpose of this 
Article is not to rebut any of the criticism of standing, but rather to explain 
its function and show some negative consequences of its abandonment. 
Thus only the main thrusts of the criticism will be sketched here. The 
criticisms of standing will be shown as orthogonal to at least one of the 
doctrine’s important functions.  
 The classic and persistent criticism is that the only proper “standing” 
inquiry is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.32 If some source of law 
allows him to sue in response to certain conduct, he has all the “injury” 
required. In this view, standing is at best a misnamed inquiry into whether 
the relevant law gives the plaintiff an entitlement against the kind of harm 
he alleges. At worst, standing is a way of delegitimizing or raising barriers 
to certain kinds of injuries disfavored by the courts. 
Moreover, the jurisdictional status of standing, combined with the 
unpredictability of the doctrine, makes it susceptible to political 
manipulation. Since it is a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, justices 
can raise doubts about standing sue sponte. And due to the amorphous and 
shifting nature of “injury-in-fact,” courts can use it as a cover for rejecting 
cases on grounds of politics, ideology, or personal convenience.  
 
D.  Economic analyses. 
Only a few scholars have examined standing from an economic 
perspective.33 One of these, a brief and unnoticed paper by Jensen, et. al., 
                                                 
32 See Fallon, Remedies, 92 U. VA. L. REV. at 664-65 (arguing that Court’s treatment 
of injury-in-fact cases are actually about the “substantive merits of the plaintiffs’ 
underlying claims”); Sunstein, Citizen Suits, 91 MICH. L. REV. at 166 n.15; Amar at 719 
n.154 (“A properly framed case in which a plaintiff has ‘standing’ is simply one in which 
she has a cause of action.”); Currie, Misunderstanding; Fletcher, Structure; Sunstein, 
Privatization;  Fletcher at 223 n.18 cites numerous additional commentators to this affect. 
33 See Michael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling, & Clifford G. Holderness, Analysis of 
Alternate Standing Doctrines, 6 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON. 205 (1986); Clifford G. 
Holderness, Standing, NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 505 
(1998); Stearns, Standing Back, supra note _ (showing that given a likelihood of 
intransitive preferences among justices, standing limits litigants’ ability to manipulate 
outcomes through strategic litigation ); Stearns, Historical Evidence, supra (elaborating the  
social choice theory of standing); Khanna,  supra note __, Functional Understanding 
(arguing that standing acts as screen for socially undesirable litigation); Scott, supra note 
__, at 669-678.  See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Towards a Functional Analysis of Standing 
3, work-in-progress (2002), [hereinafter Functional Analysis] available at 
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anticipates some of the analysis of this Article by observing that broad 
standing makes entitlements inalienable and thus generates inefficiencies.34 
The Jensen paper did not deal with standing to assert constitutional or 
public rights. Rather, it focused on the classic law and economics context of 
private nuisance litigation, and acknowledged that extending the analysis to 
public law involves additional complications.35  
This Article expands significantly on the earlier discussion, and applies 
it to new areas. Unlike the Jensen paper, this Article identifies significant 
additional transaction costs arising from strategic behavior, and examines 
the role of different remedial regimes. Furthermore, it broadens the analysis 
to include different conceptions of rights. Jensen, et. al. compare only two 
alternate regimes: strict and liberal standing. This Article considers several 
additional alternative regimes (such as switching to liability rules) that 
might perform better than either polar solution.  
   
II. STANDING AND EFFICIENCY 
  
This Part shows how broad standing to challenge certain types of 
government action could result in inefficient outcomes because of high 
                                                                                                                            
http://ssrn.com/abstract=304390 (discussing paucity of “functional analysis” of standing 
law). 
A very brief discussion of prudential standing rules can also be found in William 
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication, 23 J. LEG. 
STUD. 683, 718-19 (1994) (discussing economic rationales for barring jus tertii suits, and 
noting that allowing third parties to have standing makes it difficult to “allocate property 
rights in legal claims”). The present Article does not deal with the prudential limitation of 
jus tertii. However, it shows that under certain circumstances particularly likely to arise in 
constitutional litigation, it becomes difficult to allocate property rights in legal claims even 
when standing is given only to the primary victims. In other words, all hard standing cases 
are in a sense jus tertii cases. 
Political scientists have also devoted little attention to the doctrine. For some rare 
exceptions, see  Staudt, Modeling, supra (presenting statistical analysis demonstrating that 
when underlying law is unclear, judges use standing doctrine to advance persona policy 
preferences); C.K. Rowland & Bridget Jeffrey Todd, Where You Stand Depends on Who 
Sits: Platform Promises and Judicial Gatekeeping in the Federal District Courts, 53 J. 
POL. 175 (1991); Gregory J. Rathjen & Harold J. Spaeth, Access to the Federal Courts: An 
Analysis of Burger Court Policy Making, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 360 (1979). 
34 Jensen et. al. at 10-11. Only six citations can be found on Westlaw and JSTOR; most 
of these are only  in passing. 
35 See id. at 206-07 (discussing implications of different standing rules in context of 
private nuisance suits). Jensen et. al. only mention suits against the government in a single 
paragraph, and do not differentiate between constitutional and statutory claims. Id. at 212. 
They correctly note that their central point carries over from private law to public, but did 
not build on this. See also, Scott, supra at 646 (arguing that economic analysis of standing 
must distinguish suits against government officials from litigation between private parties 
because the “important considerations . . . overlap to a degree but are far from identical”). 
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transaction costs and the possibility of strategic behavior.36 Standing 
doctrine can be understood as a way of avoiding the potentially large social 
costs that would result from a liberal standing regime,   though this solution 
is itself not costless. 
Standing doctrine has long been  unable to formulate  coherent rules for 
principled identification of cases where it should apply. Understanding the 
problem standing responds to allows one to distinguish situations that pose 
genuine standing problems from those that do not. A basic definition will be 
presented in section B, and then further refinements to narrow the scope of 
the standing inquiry will be discussed. This Part will also show how the 
definition of standing developed here differs from the dominant account. 
 
 
A.  Structure of constitutional transactions 
 
1. Differing valuations. 
In the constitutional system, most entitlements are broadly, even 
universally, held. The entitlements are generally negative, giving the holder 
a right to be free of certain kinds of government action. However, different 
individuals attach different values to them, either in all circumstances or in 
some circumstances. There can even be differences in the sign of the values 
across entitlement holders. The value of an entitlement to a person is always 
the difference between: 
W, the welfare derived from the government action that the right 
entitles one to be free of and C, the cost of challenging it in court (assume to 
be a negative number).  
A person will be better of waiving their right when W > C, where C 
is never positive. To start with the conventional case, if the government 
action results in a welfare loss for the entitlement holders such that W = -
$100, he will exercise his right at any C to up to -$100. This person would 
bargain away the entitlement for any amount greater than $90 (the net 
benefit of enforcement). A second case deserves attention. The same 
government action may have positive welfare effects for a second 
entitlement holder, such that W = $100. She will exercise her right to block 
it at the cost of $10 only if paid at least $110 to do so.  
The first person will be better of exercising his right at certain levels of 
C, while the second person will never be better of exercising her right, 
regardless of C. The first person would demand payment to waive their 
right; the second person, on the other hand, would demand payment to 
exercise it. In the example above, if bargaining were possible, the second 
                                                 
36 “Inefficiency” is used here in the Caldor-Hicks sense to refer to the blocking of an 
action whose social benefits exceed its costs. 
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person would pay the first anywhere between $90 and $100 to waive his 
entitlement, which is efficient. All of this is a result of the welfare effect of 
the government action on the first person being negative and for the second 
person being positive. This Article shall refer to these two cases as negative 
value and positive value entitlement holders, referring to their respective 
valuation of the government action that they have a legal right to be free of. 
The notion of positive value entitlement holders may at first seem 
counterintuitive, so a few additional words should be said in this regard. It 
is important to distinguish legal injury from harm. The former refers to the 
violation of protected entitlements, the latter to value or cost of the 
violation. The same legal injury can cause harm or benefit depending on the 
person’s subjective disposition. The difference between assault and 
affection lies largely in how the recipient feels about them. In tort law, the 
difference between injury and harm is subsumed by the substantive law: a 
consensual touch is not a permissible assault, but simply no violation at all. 
The situation is less clear in constitutional law. With a police search, 
advance consent makes it “reasonable,” and thus not a violation of the 
underlying entitlement. But not all situations are like this. Ex ante consent is 
only practical on an individual level. Broad violations of the kind that give 
rise to standing questions are not, perhaps can not, be consented to in 
advance. So at least on a technical level the injury has occurred, and the 
question turns to redressability, remedy, and harm -- which may vary 
greatly among the affected group.  
As Prof. Scott has written, in a view typical of standing critics, “Once 
the reality of non-monetary injuries is accepted, it follows that an individual 
who attaches more weight to some personal value than do most does suffer 
a differential injury from its transgression.”37 But it also follows that 
individuals can attach different values to such injuries, and these may be 
positive or negative. This has important implications. If members of the 
injured class all have non-positive values, and the principal relief sought is 
injunctive (as will generally be the case in this kind of constitutional 
litigation), than a plaintiff with a greater negative value may be a fine 
representative of all others. If values can be either positive or negative, the 
ideological plaintiff’s interests may be opposed to those in the class of 
entitlement-holders the disposition of whose entitlements he is in effect 
determining. 
 
2. Highest-value use. 
From a social perspective, the highest value use of the entitlement – 
exercise or waiver – depends on the proportion of positive and negative 
                                                 
37 See Scott at 691-92. 
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value entitlement holders, and the actual values they assign. If the aggregate 
positive value exceeds the aggregate negative value, the socially optimal 
use of the entitlement is waiver. Usually none of these matters rise to the 
surface because in most government action, each individual can choose 
between exercise and waiver in a way that does not affect or limit the 
choices of others. However, when a single government action infringes on 
many entitlements at once, and injunctive remedies are available, only one 
choice can be made. 
In these circumstances, a positive value plaintiff’s valuation may not 
accord with the highest-value use of the entitlement. All would benefit if he 
could be compensated by the others, who attach a greater value to a 
different use of the entitlement, in exchange for waiving his right (which in 
this context would consist of consenting to rather than challenging the 
governmental action). However, liberal standing rules create transaction 
cost and hold out problems that make such Pareto optimal arrangements 
impossible. By giving many individuals the power to veto a government 
action that implicates the rights of many or all, broad standing makes 
constitutional rights inalienable de facto though they remain alienable de 
jure. As in any other context, the inalienability of a resource prevents it 
from being put to its highest value use. 
 For entitlements to be put to their highest value use, they must be 
alienable to some degree. This is because the law does not always know 
what the highest value use is in the wide variety of circumstances that might 
arise. The original entitlement holder’s use may be the highest value one in 
the most common circumstances or under the circumstances that obtain 
when the entitlement is allocated -- but it may not be optimal in all 
circumstances. The debate about the relative merits of property, liability and 
inalienability rules is largely about how alienable entitlements must be for 
them to be put to their highest-valued use.38 Inalienability is only desirable 
when there is a high degree of confidence that the original distribution of 
entitlements is optimal under all circumstances. This is rarely the case, and 
thus most entitlements are alienable to a significant degree. This is just as 
true of constitutional entitlements as private law ones. Sometimes 
circumstances make resources that are legally alienable de facto inalienable. 
High transaction costs are a common source of alienability limitations, and 
lowering them is universally regarded as a good role for law.  
 
                                                 
38 Compared to property rules, liability rules promote relatively easier transfer of 
entitlements, and thus on this score may promote efficient allocations; on the other hand, 
there is a greater chance that the transfer price under a liability rule would not be accurate, 
thus encouraging either too much or too little transfer.  
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Liberal standing doctrine can result in socially inefficient outcomes by 
making rights effectively inalienable when i) a single government program 
or course of conduct ii) infringes on a large number of people’s 
constitutional entitlements (the entitlement violated is the same for all 
people), and iii) and the affected group includes people with both negative 
and positive valuations of the right in question iii) and the program by its 
nature cannot be tailored to affect only non-objecting entitlement holders – 
opt-out is impractical. The inability to disaggregate governmental conduct 
that affects many at once will be called the “jointness problem.” In such 
cases, one person’s exercise of their entitlement necessarily implicates the 
entitlements of everyone else affected by the action. This will be called a 
situation of “overlapping rights.” The likelihood of fatal barriers to 
bargaining, and thus inalienability, increases the larger the class of potential 
plaintiffs, the looser its definition, and the more open its membership. 
Furthermore, the larger the size of the class, the greater the likelihood for 
holdout by low-value entitlement holders, free rider problems among the 
high-value entitlement holders. 
 
2. Inaugural example. 
The efficiency implications of broad standing can be best explained 
with an example, taken from a little-noted recent case that would have 
commanded national attention were it not dismissed for lack of standing. 
Everyone has a individual right under the First Amendment to be free of an 
establishment of religion. The right is personal: establishment does not 
violate the constitution in some sterile sense, but rather infringes on the 
seperate anti-establishment entitlements of a great number of people.39 
 A few months before a presidential inauguration, it becomes clear that 
the event will involve public prayers delivered by sectarian clergy. Learning 
of this, a committed atheist sues in federal court to enjoin the imminent 
violation of his entitlement against religious Establishment.40 Unlike the 
                                                 
39 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (upholding taxpayer standing to challenge 
government spending on establishment grounds). Indeed, challenges to Ten 
Commandments displays on public land proceed without the courts making a peep about 
standing. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 
S.Ct. 2854 (2005). At the same time, there is no taxpayer or citizen standing to challenge 
in-kind subsidies of religious institutions, suggesting at least some tension or confusion in 
the Establishment Clause standing doctrine. See Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982).  
40 Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp.2d 265, 268 (D.  D.C. 2005) (describing the plaintiff 
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plaintiff, most people are not bothered by such an inauguration, even though 
they also have a right to be free of it (call them the Indifferent). A second 
group prefers to have such an inauguration, for the sake of tradition, 
national unity, or any other reason. Call them the “Inaugurationists.” The 
plaintiff belongs to a third, much smaller portion of the population (the 
“Dissenters”) that feels aggrieved by the pending inauguration. The 
Inaugurationists and Dissenters correspond respectively to the positive and 
negative valuation entitlement-holders discussed above. 
Let the Indifferent make up 30 people out of a hypothetical population 
of 100. Their welfare will not be affected one way or the other by the 
inauguration or lack thereof. The second group consists of 69 people, who 
would each get $100 benefit from the inauguration. Their right to be free of 
this establishment has a negative value: for the sake of having the 
inauguration, they would give up their entitlement to be free of it and pay  
$100. (Entitlements can become liabilities, like a property interest in a 
junked car.) Finally, the third group consists of just one person, who would 
experience a $1000 loss from the ceremony. Finally, there is in objective 
external indicator of what group one belongs to. Group membership is open, 
since it depends entirely on subjective valuations. One can become religious 
or loose religion; one could acquire or loose an interest in inaugurations; 
one can become disgusted or indifferent to religious overtones at public 
events. A crucial consequence is that no one  knows the size of their own or 
any other group. 
The socially optimal outcome is for the inauguration to proceed. The 
inauguration would produce $6900 worth of social value and $1000 of 
social cost. And so long as the entitlements are alienable, the socially 
optimal outcome will triumph; the sixty-nine Inaugurationists could settle 
with the one Dissenter so that he would not pursue his Establishment Clause 
claim. Any settlement between $1000 and $6900 would leave everyone 
better off.  
A liberal standing regime would prevent such efficiency gains from 
being realized. While the original dissenter has an entitlement that would 
allow him to block the inauguration, so does everyone else. As a result, the 
Inaugurationists gain nothing from settling with the first dissenter, because 
as far as they know, someone else could come along and bring the same 
claim, necessitating the same settlement. Assume all settlements are for 
$1100. In the absence of the problem caused by standing, the 
Inaugurationists would be willing to settle with up to six people. But unless 
                                                                                                                            
challenging 2005 inauguration as a “well-known atheist litigant”). Newdow also brought  a 
similar suit against the 2001 inauguration, where standing was also denied. Id. at 268-89. In 
the second case, he has obtained a ticket to the inauguration, whereas in 2001 he had said 
he would watch it on television. 
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they know that there are no more than six dissenters, it does not make sense 
for them to settle with even one. Thus in the example with only one 
dissenter, there will be no settlement, despite its efficiency. 
Moreover, because of the way class membership is defined, it is 
impossible to know the number of dissenters because this number is likely 
to change. Assume that now that there initially six dissenters. They all settle 
their claims for $1100. However, if they did so, a seventh person could 
become a dissenter and bring the same claim. This is because the 
characteristic that creates the class – objection to the inauguration – does 
not create a closed class. This discussion does not assume insincere 
behavior: rather, someone can actually change their valuation of the 
entitlement. The problem becomes much more severe if one introduces 
insincere behavior; indeed, it becomes more severe simply if the 
Inaugurationists expect insincere behavior. 
Returning to the example, if a subsequent seventh dissenter were paid 
off, settlement costs would exceed the social value of the inauguration; if he 
is not, he could enjoin the inauguration, making the $6600 in payments to 
the first six dissenters pure waste. The outcome either way is inefficient, 
and so the Inaugurationists would not bother settling with anyone in the first 
place. Thus each individual’s right is in effect inalienable. This benefits no 
one, not even the dissenters. Were standing narrower the dissenter would be 
able to trade his right for something worth more to him.  
To summarize, several features of broad standing raise transaction costs 
to the point of inalienability. Since everyone has constitutional entitlements, 
the absolute number of individuals involved can make bargaining difficult. 
But this cannot be the defining feature of standing – a large number of 
plaintiffs is not generally seen as a jurisdictional bar, especially in an era of 
nation-wide class actions. Perhaps more importantly, liberal standing rules 
make bargaining difficult because buyers (high value entitlement holders) 
cannot identify sellers – the difference between the two turns on 
unobservable characteristics such as ideology or sensibility or other matters 
of preference. This also leaves the seller class open. The openness 
combined with the ability of any one person to veto the entire transaction 
threatens to make negotiation with any identified class member pointless. 
 
3. Holdout. 
Even if the dissenting class were small, identifiable and closed, the 
strategic behavior could foil socially valuable action because any one 
entitlement holder exercises veto power over a government program that 
involves the entitlements of many. The situation resembles one where the 
government needs to purchase ten adjacent lots to expand an airport 
runway. Each transaction is legally distinct; each property owner can only 
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transfer his individual parcel. However, to realize its goal, the government 
must purchase all the lots; it does not get 90% of the benefit if it buys nine 
houses but not the one in the middle; rather, until is secures 100% of the 
rights, it gets none of the benefit.  
While each individual only owns his own parcel, the structure of the 
situation gives him the bargaining power that an owner of all the parcels 
would have. Because the realization of the social surplus depends on the 
consent of each owner, each owner can hold out for a disproportionately 
high share of surplus – in this example, more than one tenth. In effect, the 
combined parcels have ten different owners. This kind of strategic behavior, 
known as holdout, makes transactional breakdown likely.41 Satisfying the 
demands of all of the owners would wipe out the social surplus. Of course, 
a complete failure of the transaction is a lost opportunity for the owners. 
They might try to organize themselves to present a coordinated settlement. 
Here the will face all the difficulties of cartelization. Even assuming they 
can do this, there will always be an incentive for one of the owners at the 
last minute to demand a slightly greater amount from the government. 
Entitlement holders in these situations are likely to be geographically 
isolated, with few or no prior interactions, united only by their common 
valuation of the entitlement (that is, by valuing the affirmative exercise of 
the entitlement more highly than its waiver). It would be difficult for such a 
group, lacking any means of coercion over its members, to organize itself 
and prevent last minute cheating.  
Thus broad standing presents the holdout problem on a massive scale. 
The more open the standing doctrine, the greater the number of de facto 
“co-owners” of the entitlement. As the number of co-owners increases, so 
does the likelihood of holdout. Moreover, the possibility of co-ordination 
decreases. In the inauguration example, when the potential plaintiffs include 
everyone in the country, holdout seems guaranteed. 
 
4. Other problems.  
Thus far it has been assumed that the only obstacle to the 
Inaugurationists dividing a social surplus with potential objectors is that the 
diffuse and uncertain distribution of entitlements makes them inalienable. 
Holdout problems prevent potential objectors from organizing themselves 
to surmount this difficulty. But broad standing makes it difficult for both 
sides to organize. While the negative-valuation people face holdout 
problems, the positive-valuation ones would face free-riders problems in 
organizing themselves to pay compensation. The same thing that makes it 
                                                 
41 See Calabresi & Melamed; A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The 
Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1078 
(1980). 
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difficult for the Inaugurationists to know who the dissenters are will make it 
hard for them to identify who members of their own group are; certainly 
some will claim to be dissenters or Agnostics when the contribution hat is 
passed. In short, broad standing raises transaction costs in a way that can 
make otherwise attractive arrangements practically impossible.  
If the number of positive-valuation entitlement-holders were high 
enough, one can imagine the government acting as an agent for them. This 
would be convenient since in a constitutional case, the government will be 
the defendant and thus its interests coincide with those of the positive-
valuation group. This is an imperfect solution, of course. Its willingness to 
pay is an imperfect measure of the value of the entitlement. The government 
may settle even when it is inefficient – that is, it may offer a settlement that 
exceeds the surplus of the Inaugurationists simply to avoid an adverse 
constitutional ruling.  
 
5. Cause of action theory distinguished. 
Understanding the “jointness” problem to which standing responds 
shows that both the courts and commentators at least partially 
misunderstand the nature and function of the doctrine. Standing is not about 
the identity of the plaintiff, as doctrine would have it. Nor is it simply about 
whether the plaintiff has a legally protected right, as critics of the doctrine 
claim. Rather, the standing problem arises because of the nature of the 
challenged action. 
In the account of standing given here, the doctrine does its work 
precisely when a plaintiff has a genuine cause of action but the social costs 
of entertaining it exceed the plaintiff’s valuation of his entitlement but 
transactions costs block an efficient solution. This account accepts the 
criticism of standing doctrine that an individual who claims to be injured by 
a violation of his constitutional rights cannot be presumed to be a liar at the 
pleading stage. At the same time, it rejects the critics’ view that the sole 
question is whether the statute gives individuals such as the plaintiff a cause 
of action. Because even if it does, one must ask whether the individual 
causes of action overlap, and if this will result in socially suboptimal 
allocations of the individual rights.  
This does not deny the importance of the academic criticism of standing 
– no doubt courts sometimes deny standing based on implicit judgments 
about whether the plaintiff can state a claim, or hostility to the kind of rights 
the plaintiff asserts.42 Using standing to discuss substance is unjustifiable – 
and in such situation, standing can not be expected to solve jointness 
problems because there may be no jointness problem to solve. Standing 
                                                 
42 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
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does not serve efficiency purposes simply by being invoked by a court; it 
needs to be invoked in response to a particular structure of challenged 
conduct and distributed rights. However, this Article shows that there is an 
autonomous role for standing doctrine, entirely separate from the merits, 
and when used in this role, the doctrine serves broad social ends.  
 
C.  Denying Standing 
 
The definition introduced Part II.B.1 only identifies situations that might 
raise the problems to which standing responds. It does not mean that 
denying standing is the best response in all such situations. The denial of 
standing on transaction cost grounds must depend on at least two additional 
determinations. First, that the plaintiff is not the high-value user – that is, 
that the buy-out of an injunction would be the socially desirable outcome. 
Second, that transaction costs would likely frustrate such an efficient 
resolution between the plaintiff and higher-value users.  
The first inquiry in particular risks being impressionistic and ad hoc. 
Judges, especially before discovery, have little direct evidence of the 
plaintiff’s valuation of her entitlement, and even less about the valuations of 
the myriad absent entitlement holders. To be sure, a court is not entirely 
without information about the valuations of the large mass of non-litigious 
entitlement holders. As many commentators have noted, the fact that the 
plaintiff’s preferred use differs from that of the great majority of other 
entitlement holders can be inferred from the mere fact that the plaintiff, 
unlike others, has chosen to seek judicial remedies. What it does not know 
is whether those who do not pursue remedies are indifferent, or whether 
they have a definite preference for waiver. 
This suggests that not every case raising standing problems requires a 
denial of standing answer. Rather, dismissals might be reserved for cases 
where the social value determination (which it must be stressed is not a 
normative one) seems clear, such as Richardson. Of course, such an 
approach to standing sounds more like a prudential policy rather than a 
strict jurisdictional bar, and were the Court to take such approach, standing 
doctrine would seem  erratic (as it currently does) in that the same kind of 
injury would sometimes get standing and sometimes not. On the other hand, 
one might think such pessimism is unwarranted, as the endeavor is not so 
different from a court attempting to “reconstruct the hypothetical bargain” 
in contract interpretation. In both situations, the court attempts to anticipate 
what would happen if transaction costs did not prevent an explicit 
agreement. Still, from an efficiency perspective, the lack of information 
about private valuations is the main limitation or objection to the standing 
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doctrine as a solution to the jointness problem.43 As Part III argues, this 
objection drops away if the jointness and overlapping rights problems are 
viewed from a rights-based perspective. 
Once a jointness problem is identified, and the court think the plaintiff’s 
might not be the highest value use, the second question arises: whether the 
court needs to preempt the market because transaction costs would prevent 
efficient final allocations. This is the question of whether the transaction 
costs are high enough to block efficient exchange. Jointness is a matter of 
degree. At the extreme end of the spectrum are single, national actions like 
an inauguration, a congressional prayer or the disclosure of official 
information. In these situations, the costs of liberal standing will be highest. 
At the other end of the spectrum are actions with minimal rights overlap, 
such co-owners Fourth Amendment search rights. These present no 
jointness problems. Many cases will in middle – where the action affects a 
subset of the population. Most religious display cases will be of this variety. 
A Ten Commandments display in a county courthouse will affect many 
people, but fewer than a national inauguration. 
Again, the question of when transaction costs from group size become 
high enough to threaten efficient bargains is an empirical one, and not 
unique to the standing doctrine. Despite the extensive law and economics 
literature on large-numbers transaction costs in private law, there is almost 
no discussion of what might constitute “large.”44 Still, given what is 
considered a “large group” in the experimental literature,45 it seems that all 
assume that jointness on the scale created by even localized government 
action would pose significant transaction problems. (Recall also that the 
jointness problem is not simply one of large numbers, but also of an 
indefinite and open class.) 
 
D.  The Definition Applied. 
Having defined the identifying features of a transaction-cost based 
standing problem and shown the differences between this and the cause-of-
action understanding of standing, this section will show how this definition 
                                                 
43 See James E. Krier and Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The 
Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440, 464 (1995) (arguing that difficulty of 
assessing private values argues for property rules in almost all situations). 
44 See Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Tests of the Coase 
Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups, 15 J. LEG. STUD. 149, 171 (1986) (concluding 
from experiments with students that transaction costs of negotiating not prohibitive when 
there are less than 38 parties). See also, Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties To Nuisance Cases 
Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside The Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 382 
(1999) (presenting case studies suggesting that post-injunction bargaining often does not 
occur even when there are few parties). 
45 See Hoffman & Spitzer,  note  __ supra. 
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can be used to identify standing problems involving constitutional rights 
that all agree create individual entitlements and causes of action. The 
example shows how the function of standing described here can in 
particular cases produce results different from those that would be reached 
under the dominant understandings of the doctrine. The first example would 
be justiciable under standing doctrine as understood by the Court, but not 
under the definition presented here; the second might not be justiciable 
under current doctrine but should be under the definition presented here. 
 
1. Fourth Amendment and data mining. 
Individuals subject to searches have standing to raise Fourth 
Amendment objections.46 But this is not inherent in the Fourth Amendment, 
rather, it is a consequence of the kinds of actions that typically violate it. 
Searches take place one person, or one premise, at a time. Even if a single 
police sweep targets many homes, each person can individually seek to 
enjoin the search. If five out of a hundred people sue and obtain injunctions 
while the other ninety-five consent, ninety-five searches can take place: the 
action is divisible. The divisible nature of the defendant’s conduct means 
standing questions will not arise. 
Now consider a situation where standing problems can arise under the 
Fourth Amendment. The government uses a data mining program to sift and 
process massive amounts of anonymous personal information.47 Vast 
databases from credit card companies, airlines, and others are fed into the 
program, which searches for patterns suggestive of terrorist activity. 
Because the information is not initially tagged with people’s names, and the 
databases that are used must remain secret for the program to work, it is 
impossible to seek out people’s consent to such a search. Because it is 
impossible to exclude opt-outs from the program, a Fourth Amendment 
challenge would raise the exact same jointness problem seen in Richardson 
and Schlesinger.  
The assertion of Fourth Amendment rights by one person would lead to 
an injunction that would block the (potentially) consensual searches of a 
vast multitude. The analysis presented here shows that though the 
entitlement involved is the Fourth Amendment, the suit raises a standing 
                                                 
46 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding 
that Fourth Amendment provides a basis for judicial relief even without a congressionally-
created cause of action). 
47 This hypothetical is motivated by programs like the Computer Assisted Passenger 
Profiling System II or the Defense Department’s Total Information Awareness Program. It 
does not attempt to faithfully represent the details of any particular data mining effort, 
many of which remain classified. It is sufficient for present purposes that a program with 
the characteristics described here is one the government could very realistically wish to 
implement.  
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problem, and the correct resolution may be to deny standing. Whether 
standing should be denied will depend on a court’s estimation of what 
proportion of the affected group prefer to enjoin the practice, what 
proportion would consent, and the relative valuations of each.  
 
2. Legislative standing.  
 
In the 1970s, congressmen began to turn to the federal courts, and in 
particular, the D.C. Circuit to challenge actions by the Executive or even 
their own house.48 The question is whether they have standing on the 
ground that the action weakens the power of their office or branch.49 The 
Supreme Court only recently entered the fray, denying standing to a few 
members of the House and Senate who challenged the Line Item Veto Act 
on separation of powers grounds.50 The plaintiffs argued that if the 
president could unbundle legislation, it reduces the voting power of each 
legislator. The Court found this too “abstract and widely dispersed” to 
constitute an “injury-in-fact.”  
In terms of the transaction-cost function of standing, Raines appears 
unjustified. Congress consists of a relatively small number of people, whose 
identities are known and fixed. Legislators and Congress as in institution 
can be successfully negotiated with either by other legislators or the 
Executive Branch; it happens every day. 
There may be a concern that allowing individual legislator standing 
effectively creates a one-congressman veto, far different from the majority 
rule envisioned by Art. I. But it will exist only if the challenged action is 
actually unconstitutional; the veto is not the legislator’s but the 
Constitution’s. Unlike in the situations discussed above, there is nothing 
about the transaction costs would prevent effective bargaining.  
 
E.  Objections.  
The discussion has assumed that rights can be understood in the 
                                                 
48 FALLON, MELTZER HART & WESCHLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM  at 165. 
49 The D.C. Circuit has generally allowed such suits. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 
511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that senator has standing to challenge 
constitutionality of pocket veto because it negates his vote for the vetoed legislation); 
Mitchell v. Laird (holding that congressmen have standing to challenge Vietnam War on 
separation of powers grounds but dismissing on political question grounds); Nader v. Bork, 
366 F. Supp. 104 (D. D.C. 1973) (finding legislative standing but no citizen standing to 
challenge firing of Watergate Special Prosecutor). But see Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 
F.2d 1307, 1315 (2nd Cir. 1973) (holding that congresswoman lacks standing to challenge 
Vietnam War on separation of powers grounds) 
50 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997). 
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fundamentally utilitarian Coasean framework. Now two broad objections 
will be addressed. Much of liberal constitutional theory holds that rights are 
“trumps,” and rejects the notion that they should yield to even powerful 
social welfare considerations.51 This is a radically individualistic 
understanding of rights – each individual’s exercise of her rights supersedes 
all communal considerations.52 
The second objection regards constitutional rights as merit goods, 
designed to protect not only or even primarily the individual entitlement-
holders, but rather broader social interests.53 Assigning these rights to 
individuals is merely a convenient enforcement tool since they will have the 
most immediate knowledge of violations and the greatest incentive to 
litigate. However, individuals’ private valuations of their rights do not 
reflect the social benefit of exercising the right. In this view, there is cause 
to celebrate if liberal standing, by preventing settlement, blocks 
encroachments on constitutional entitlements. The inefficiencies that might 
result from liberal standing are illusory, in that they are calculated solely on 
the parties’ private valuations, disregarding the even larger merit good value 
of the right. Liberal standing, by making rights effectively inalienable, gets 
the results argued for by Owen Fiss’s radical Against Settlement position54 
through a backdoor – a good thing if one thinks there is no such thing as an 
efficient violation of constitutional rights.  
The rights-as-trumps argument will be dealt with more fully in the next 
Part; the merit good argument will be considered here. Undoubtedly the 
exercise of constitutional entitlements can have structural benefits, and an 
individual’s valuation of a right may not capture all the positive 
externalities of its exercise. The value of a right can have both private and 
public components. However, determining what portion of right’s value is 
the private value and what is the additional merit value is difficult. Saying 
there is some broader value not reflected in individuals’ valuations does not 
meant the efficient level of constitutional violation is zero – yet a liberal 
standing regime will result in a zero level so long as one person is willing to 
sue. Similarly, saying private valuation captures much of the value in a right 
does not mean it captures all of it. Thus there could be cases where the sum 
                                                 
51 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1977) (“[T]he prospect of 
utilitarian gains cannot justify preventing a man from doing what he has a right to do.”). 
52 See Richard Pildes, Rights are Not Trumps, 27 J. LEG. STUD. 725 (1988). 
53 See REDISH, POLITICAL ORDER at 93-95 (arguing that issues involved in litigation go 
far beyond the interests of the particular plaintiff, and thus injury-in-fact requirement 
artificially limits ability of courts to vindicate those interests); Tribe, Inalienable Rights, 99 
HARV. L. REV. at 332-3334 (arguing that there are a some rights that are not individual but 
try to structure society in particular ways, and “individuals cannot waive them because 
individuals are not their sole focus”). 
54 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) 
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of the plaintiff’s private value and the merit good value exceeds the 
aggregate of the private valuations on the other side. This mean that a denial 
of standing is not always the correct response to a transaction-cost based 
standing problem. 
The goal here is not to make a normative case for a private-rights view 
of the constitution. The only contention is that there is nothing artificial or 
unfaithful to the constitutional system in describing standing as a way to 
safeguard against social welfare losses where social welfare is measured as 
the aggregate of private values. The design of our system of rights is 
premised on individual values being good proxies for public values. This is 
suggested by the central role of individuals in asserting constitutional rights. 
As will be discussed in more detail in Part III, constitutional rights are 
freely alienable at the discretion of their individual holders. They can be 
contracted away for consideration or waived for no reason at all. If a person, 
or group of people, wish to tolerate a violation of their constitutional 
entitlements, nothing in the law can compel them to stand on their rights. 
There is no doctrine of misprision of constitutional violations, as there is for 
felonies. The vast flexibility which individuals have in disposing of their 
constitutional entitlements suggests the system is based on an assumption 
that there is little slippage between the public and private value of right 
assertion. 
This function of standing is not based on any independent view of the 
public value of rights. Rather, on the face of prohibitive transaction costs, 
standing attempts to replicate as closely as possible the situation that would 
obtain if transaction costs were low. Recall that the efficiency-promoting 
property of standing is purely an artifact of jointness, which is entirely a 
matter of circumstances, lacking any value-content. When a single 
individual chooses to waive or settle a constitutional entitlement – by 
agreeing to suppress a newspaper story, for example, the merit good value 
of asserting the constitutional right is forfeit. The ubiquity of such waivers 
and the general tolerance of them, suggests that at least on the individual 
scale, the merit good component of rights is less than its private value. 
Jointness simply involves the aggregation of many private and merit good 
values across many people; the ratio of the private to merit value does not 
necessarily change when many are injured. It seems artificial to think 
individuals are the best judges of the value of their entitlements when the 
government violates them serially, but not when the government violates 
them simultaneously. Indeed, settlement is permitted in  class action suits 
involving constitutional rights – even when the settlement does fully 
vindicate the interests of some class members.55 Thus even in group 
                                                 
55 See Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1997 (7th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted) which held 
that the constitutional status of class action claims does not prevent their settlement:  
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litigation involving public rights, individual valuations play the leading role.  
Jointness may sometimes result in a conflict between maximizing the 
private and public value of an entitlement. Thus far, only corner solutions 
have been considered: denying the private value (liberal standing) or the 
public value (narrow standing). One does not need to deny the reality of 
public value to think that when it is in tension with private value, the 
outcome should depend on whether the aggregate private loss exceeds the 
public value. Parts IV will alternatives solutions that would at least partially 
vindicate both interests. 
 
 
III. STANDING AS PROTECTION FOR RIGHTS 
 
Understanding the jointness problem allows one to recognize another 
publicly-minded function of the injury-in-fact requirement: protecting 
individuals’ choices about the exercise of their rights. This Part develops a 
new account of standing that parallels the transaction-cost account in Part 
II. Here, however, the Coasean framework is set aside in favor of a rights-
based approach. As will be seen, jointness produces undesirable outcomes 
in a framework that treats rights as incommensurable or trumps. 
This Part also responds to a series of related objections to the jointness 
theory of standing. Recall the “rights-as-trumps” objection raised in Part 
II.E. Constitutional theory does not typically conceptualize constitutional 
rights as “resources” or “entitlements,” so the notion that constitutional law 
should direct them towards their highest-value use may seem odd. 
Moreover, many believe that for reasons of incommensurability, 
constitutional rights cannot be reduced to the arithmetic of efficiency. 
Furthermore, constitutional rights are a response to fears of majoritarian 
exploitation. Individual rights loose their luster if they do not protect the 
unpopular activity of the few, or even the one. One might think the 
efficiency function of standing is illegitimate, as it contemplates sacrificing 
the rights of a few to satisfy majoritarian preferences.56  
This Part shows that because of the jointness phenomenon, liberal 
standing has consequences that can be measured purely in terms of 
individual rights. The rights of the plaintiff whose standing is in question 
                                                                                                                            
 Where . . . constitutional claims are asserted, we recognize that public 
interests may potentially conflict with the desire of the parties to settle their 
dispute. The presence of constitutional claims does not, however, prevent us from 
applying the principles that guide our review which allow ample room for 
settlement and compromise. 
56 See REDISH, POLITICAL ORDER at 93-95 (arguing that injury-in-fact requirement 
interferes with Court’s function as a counter-majoritarian check of the political branches); 
Epstein, Standing and Spending, at 34. 
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conflict not merely with the preferences or welfare of others, but with their 
own constitutional rights. Thus standing problems represent not just a trade-
off between the vindication of constitutional rights and the maximization of 
social welfare; they also represent a “rights-rights” trade-off.57 The 
efficiency and rights-based functions of standing are isomorphic but 
logically and doctrinally distinct. They also have different normative 
implications, with the rights-based function more clearly supporting a 
robust standing doctrine than the more fact-dependent efficiency function.   
 
A.  Two sides of rights. 
 
1. Non-exercise and waiver. 
An important but often overlooked portion of a legal entitlement is the 
right to not exercise it through litigation. One need not bring all causes of 
action one possesses. One can waive one’s rights because of distaste for 
litigation, a desire to maintain good relations with others, or any other 
reason. This is evident for standard tort or contract causes of action. As 
first-year students realize, with a chill, when reading Vosburg v. Putney, tort 
causes of action accrue all the time; it is mostly the aggrieved entitlement 
holders’ private decisions not to exercise their rights that keeps the courts 
from being flooded with claims of assault.58 Torts occur far more often than 
they are litigated because rights-holders choose to not assert them. 
The same is true of constitutional rights, as will be developed below. 
Constitutional rights give their bearers the option to block governmental 
action, but they do not require them to do so.59 They can exercise their right, 
relinquish it in exchange for some consideration, to avoid social stigma, or 
waive it for no reason at all. In Calabresi & Melamed terms, constitutional 
rights are protected by property rules rather than inalienability rules.60 
                                                 
57 See ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION at 258. 
58 See Santabello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (suggesting courts could not 
function were it not for the high rate of plea bargains by criminal defendants). 
59 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 289, 3017 (1983) (arguing that plea bargaining is underpinned by the “autonomy 
value” of rights, defined as “the right to waive one’s rights as one method of exercising 
them”). See generally, Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward A Positive Theory of 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1217 (1990) (“[O]urs is primarily 
a market economy and that economic structure has inescapable implications for the 
meaning and operation of constitutional rights,” such as the fact that the exercise of rights 
has an explicit or implicit price). 
60 The picture is actually more complicated. Inalienability is a matter of degree, and 
almost all rights are inalienable in some weak sense. A right is inalienable in the strongest 
sense if it cannot be waived or bargained away in whole or in part for any reason. Perhaps 
only the Thirteenth Amendment is inalienable in this sense. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 
U.S. 219, 241-43 (1911) (Holmes, J.) (holding unenforceable a voluntary personal service 
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Injunctive relief is not automatically activated when the entitlement is 
threatened; equity only acts at the petition of the rights-holder. As with 
private law property rules, the option to enjoin the government simply sets 
the maximum price at which the entitlement can be taken, namely, the 
owner’s reservation price. This can be zero, or even negative (which would 
mean the owner would not only waive the right, but pay the government to 
take the action).  
 
2. Constitutional entitlements. 
While constitutional entitlements are regarded as more solemn than 
common law or statutory ones, they are generally waivable like ordinary 
tort rights.61 This is most evident for the Constitution’s numerous rights for 
criminal defendants.62 To take a ubiquitous example, plea bargains waive 
the Fifth Amendment right to liberty63 in exchange for favorable 
consideration from the prosecutor, to avoid the bother or embarrassment of 
trial, a desire to pay for one’s crime, or no reason at all. A plea-bargain also 
                                                                                                                            
contract that contemplates enforcement through specific performance or punitive damages). 
See also, Kontorovich, Liability Rules, at 763-64 n.18 (describing Thirteenth Amendment’s 
ban on “involuntary servitude” as a inalienability rule); Kreimer, 132 U. PA. L. REV. at 
1293. A weaker inalienability forbids trading the right, but allows simple waiver and 
abandonment. The right to vote is of this kind. One cannot sell it, but one can waive it, as 
most people do. (By contrast, in many Western nations, voting is obligatory because it is 
seen as serving primarily public; the absence of such laws in the U.S. is due  in part to the 
presumptive waivability of rights.)  
In the weakest version, one simply cannot permanently waive or trade all of the 
protection afforded by an entitlement. For example, one cannot permanently shrug off 
Fourth Amendment protection with a single act. Most if not all constitutional rights are 
inalienable in this very loose sense. However, the right to object to particular actions is a 
component of the broader entitlement. And while the latter can be inalienable as a whole, 
the smaller parts are alienable, and indeed, the sum of the parts can alienable. But this very 
narrow kind of inalienability of constitutional rights has nothing to do with constitutional 
values. One also cannot contract away one’s ability in general to make contracts, or to be 
protected by the tort system, though one can contract away one’s ability to make contracts 
with particular people or to recover for torts in certain circumstances. 
61 Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1444 n.2 (9th Cir. 1989) (observing that “most 
constitutional  rights are waivable”). See Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding 
Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 330 (1985) (“In our constitutional system, rights tend to be individual, 
alienable…. [and] subject to boding waiver or alienation.”) 
62 See Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 871 (2003) (observing 
that while the “waiver doctrine” generally permits forfeiting or even bargaining away 
criminal defense rights in exchange for some benefit from the government, the parallel 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions severely restricts individuals’ ability to bargain 
away First Amendment rights).  
63 United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 378 (1982) (noting legitimacy of plea 
bargaining).  
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waives all constitutional trial rights, such as the right not to incriminate 
oneself, the right to a jury, and the confrontation right. All of these rights 
can also be waived with or without consideration from the government.64  
The Sixth Amendment entitles criminal defendants to a lawyer. This 
right is considered important enough that suspects must be informed of it 
upon their arrest, and government must pay for counsel for those who 
cannot afford them. However, defendants can forgo the entitlement to 
counsel even for idiosyncratic or foolish reasons,65 and even if this does not 
serve the broader social end of justice, in the sense of the search for the 
objective truth or the restraint of governmental misconduct. The individual 
controls the disposition of his entitlements because he bears the immediate 
and most salient consequences of his choices, not because he bears all the 
consequences.66 
The ability to bargain away constitutional rights for something of 
greater value is not peculiar to criminal procedure. People can block 
unwarranted searches of their homes or belongings. But they can also 
consent to such searches. This right is often waived because the entitlement 
holder feels the governmental action benefits him more than it harms him. 
For example, someone may consent to a search to be assured that a 
dangerous fugitive is not hiding in his house. More generally, someone 
might forgo the right to avoid unwarranted searches because they estimate 
the cooperation with the police generally facilitates law enforcement and 
produces social benefits that outweigh the intrusion of the search. The 
crucial point is that the individual himself, and no one else, weighs the 
benefits of the government action relative to the intrusion on his 
constitutionally-protected privacy. 
Journalists have a First Amendment right to publish at least some 
national security-related information over the government’s objection. 
However, the press can waive this right by agreeing to not publish the 
information at the government’s request. This consent might be given out a 
belief that the national security interests involve trump the informational 
                                                 
64 To be sure, plea agreements are policed by the court for voluntariness and the like. 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prevents, in certain circumstances, the 
government from leveraging its market power in one context to extract concessions in 
another. But this does not take any of the constitutional entitlements involved out of the 
general paradigm of alienability. Even the right to contract away entitlements in private law 
is limited at the margins by judicial policing against fraud and overreaching, akin to review 
of plea agreements. And the ability to transfer rights through contracting is limited by 
antitrust restrictions on tying arrangements. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-15 (1988). 
65 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 801 (1975). 
66 Id.  (noting that the “right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who 
suffers the consequences if the defense fails.”). 
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ones, even in a situation in which a court would strike this balance 
differently. Such a waiver of First Amendment privileges can even be 
granted for purely self-interested reasons -- to avoid alienating readers or 
for promises of scoops in the future.  
The ability to consent to unconstitutional activity is evident from the 
recent cases invalidating long-standing public religious displays, such as the 
Ten Commandments. Presumably these displays were unconstitutional 
since their inception,67 thus violating the rights of tens of thousands of 
individuals. That a case only emerged after several decades of ongoing 
violation shows that all the affected individuals chose to forgo the judicial 
assertion of their rights, presumably because the value they attached to the 
display was greater than the value they attached to their Establishment right 
net of litigation costs.  
The waiver or consent discussed here, like the bargains discussed in Part 
II, are usually informal and implicit – an entitlement holder simply does not 
bring a legal action. But constitutional entitlements can also be contracted 
away in a formal manner.68 A rights holder can brings a suit against the 
government and then settle it. The settlement extinguishes his right to sue, 
in exchange for some consideration – and a settlement of a constitutional 
claim is simply a common law contract.69  
 
B.  Rights-rights trade-offs 
 
The role of the standing doctrine as a response to jointness problems can 
now be described. As we have seen, constitutional rights can generally be 
waived or contracted away. Each individual can decide how to use their 
right – negatively or affirmatively. But under conditions of jointness,  
people cannot choose individually to trade their rights. The active exercise 
by one party precludes the passive exercise by all others. If the passive 
exercise is understood as a legitimate way of exercising rights, then the one 
plaintiff limits all the other entitlement holders’ ability to exercise their 
rights as they see fit.  
A constitutional entitlement’s value to its owner has two relevant 
                                                 
67 Indeed, the Court suggested that time may blunt their illegality. 
68 See Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assoc., 442 F.3d 
410, 446 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Most individually held constitutional rights may be waived.  . . 
Some constitutional rights are so obviously alienable that no one would challenge the 
idea.”); Erie Telecommunications v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1096 (3rd Cir. 1988) 
(“]C]onstitutional [free expression] rights, like rights and privileges of lesser importance, 
may be contractually waived”). 
69 Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Because the 
parties are not diverse, any suit to enforce the settlement agreement . . . would have to be 
brought in state court even though the settlement was of federal . . . claims.”) 
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components. Part of its value comes from being able to use it affirmatively, 
to be free of conduct that violates the entitlement. Part of the value consists 
in the option to waive or trade it. This is the option value of the entitlement. 
Even if the entitlement holder would never actually trade it, the power to do 
so in the future has some real present value. Thus an action by a third party 
that prevents alienability destroys part of the right’s value.70 In Richardson, 
for example, if even one individual brings suit, everyone else can no longer 
exercise their individual option to sue or not sue; to know or not know. If 
part of the value of a right is the ability to not exercise it, then the Accounts 
Clause plaintiff diminishes the value of everyone else’s right – he interferes 
with their ability to use their right as they see fit by rendering any waiver 
moot.  
The important point here is the tension is not between one person’s 
exercise of his constitutional entitlement and the naked majoritarian 
preferences of others. Everyone has just as much rights at stake. The ability 
to waive a right is ultimately a product of the right. And thus the tension is 
between rights on one hand and rights on the other. Even if one thinks that 
the “right of way” should be given to the affirmative exercise of a right as 
against the passive exercise, this does not say how to deal with a situation 
where there is one affirmative exercise on one side, and a thousand passive 
exercises on the other.  
Because one person’s exercise of his right implicates everyone else’s 
exercise of theirs, it becomes clear that all proper uses of the standing 
doctrine are in an important sense about third-party standing or jus tertii.71 
This is a prudential doctrine that prohibits a plaintiff from litigating the 
rights of others, even when there is a cognizable injury to the absent party. 
The Court has observed that a reason to deny standing when “the rights of 
third parties are implicated [is] the avoidance of the adjudication of rights 
which those not before the Court may not wish to assert.”72 The analysis 
here shows that all true injury-in-fact problems are in part third party 
standing problems. In situations of jointness, a party seeking to vindicate his 
own rights necessarily litigates the rights of others as well.  
 
                                                 
70 See Frank J. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, 
and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 347: 
One aspect of the value of a right--whether a constitutional right or title to 
land--is that it can be sold and both parties to the bargain made better off. A right 
that cannot be sold is worth less than an otherwise-identical right that may be sold. 
Those who believe in the value of constitutional rights should endorse their 
exercise by sale as well as their exercise by other action. 
71 See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW at 598.  
72 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978) 
(emphasis added). 
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C.  Alienability as a Right 
 
One might object that the right to waive or trade a constitutional 
entitlement is not of the same dimension or magnitude as the right to 
exercise it. The right to be free of governmental conduct might not include 
the right to consent to it. Of course, consent is allowed – but this may be for 
practical rather than constitutional reasons. The waiver right might be 
thought of as a second-order, derivative right. One might sharpen this 
argument and contend that the right to waive constitutional rights is not 
itself a constitutional right at all, but merely a consequence of having 
constitutional rights in a system of private litigation. The consequence is 
tolerated, but not protected.  
Such a conception of the waiver right is plausible, but not obviously 
correct. The alienability of rights seems to be not an accident, but a feature, 
albeit implicit, of the system of constitutional entitlements. That is, the 
waivability of constitutional protections is the constitutional default, as 
evidenced by inalienability having to be a specified exception. To put it 
differently, if the inalienability of certain rights is a matter of constitutional 
law, it suggests, until demonstrated otherwise, the alienability (through 
contract or waiver) of the majority of rights is also a matter of constitutional 
law. Thus alienability is itself a constitutionally protected interest. Finally, 
accepting the passive use of a right as being part of the right itself does not 
require believing that it is as important as the affirmative use. One need 
only believe that both are aspects of the same right. For if the alienability 
right is relatively less important than the exercise right, but both are 
“rights,” than the alienability rights of many people might trump the 
exercise rights of a few.  
There is little law or scholarship on this question, no doubt because 
waived rights do not give rise to cases. The few Supreme Court cases 
touching on this issue will now be examined closely. The cases are 
ultimately inconclusive, but they suggest, especially the more recent ones, 
that the non-exercise of a right is part of the protected autonomy interest 
conferred by the right.  
 
1. Singer v. United States & Faretta v. California..  
The two occasions on which the Supreme Court has most explicitly 
considered these questions (both times with respect to trial procedure 
rights), it has come to different conclusions. In Singer v. United States,73 a 
criminal defendant wanted, against the prosecutor’s wishes, to waive his 
right to a jury and have his case tried to the bench.74 He premised his 
                                                 
73 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965). 
74 Id. at 26 (“Petitioner further urges that since a defendant can waive other 
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argument on the general waivability of constitutional rights. The Supreme 
Court upheld the trial judge’s refusal to allow the waiver – not because 
there jury right cannot be waived, but because the Constitution does not 
affirmatively give anyone a right to a bench trial.75  While the court found 
the defendant did have the “ability” to waive a jury if the judge and 
prosecutor agreed, it went on to find that the “defendant’s only 
constitutional right concerning the method of trial is to an impartial trial by 
jury.”76 This language could suggest that the waiver right is of a lesser 
dimension, and perhaps different source, than this substantive right.  
 Singer would lead some to think that a defendant has no right to 
refuse counsel,77 yet ten later the Court in Faretta held that the right to 
counsel does include a right to waive counsel. The Court reconciled Singer 
by taking an implied rights approach. The Court concluded that the right to 
assistance of counsel implies, by virtue of its goals and history, a 
substantive right to no counsel – this is not a waiver right, but a substantive 
right of its own. On the other hand, nothing about the history or purposes of 
a public trial right suggests it needs to be supported with an implicit right to 
a bench trial alternative.78 The entire discussion is thus framed not in terms 
of whether one has a right to waive rights, but whether one has a right to 
particular outcomes. As a result, Faretta attempts to reconcile itself with 
Singer by saying that there is no general answer to the waiver question, but 
rather a separate inquiry for each right. Of course, this smacks of ad 
hockery - a desire to limit the previous case to its facts.79 The Court does 
note in a dictum that a “defendant’s power to waive [a] right” does not 
“mechanically” give rise to a constitutional “right” to waiver, but rather a 
right-by-right analysis is required.80 
There is a better way to understand these cases. They simply mean  that 
a negative right cannot be transformed into an affirmative one. As is well 
known, constitutional law disfavors the creation of affirmative duties from 
the government to citizens. In the typical waiver context, the individual has 
                                                                                                                            
constitutional rights without the consent of the Government, he must necessarily have a 
similar right to waive a jury trial.”). 
75 Id. at 34. 
76 Id. at 34-35 (emphasis added). 
77 See, e.g., People v. Sharp, P.2d 489, 493 (Cal. 1972) (“[C]onstitutional language 
granting the right to the assistance of counsel lends no express support to a claim that an 
accused has the constitutional right to defend without counsel. . .  the right to waive a 
constitutional protection is not itself necessarily a right of constitutional dimensions.”), 
citing Singer. 
78 Singer, 380 U.S. at 28-33. 
79 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 n.15 (noting that the decision is not a “mechanical” 
application of previous principles). 
80 Id. (emphasis added). 
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an entitlement to be free of certain action; the waiver allows the action to 
take place but does not obligate the government to do it. If a citizen sees a 
police officer on the street, stops her and consents to be searched, the officer 
is not obligated by the fact of the citizen’s waiver to search him. The officer 
simply has the option. Similarly, in a plea negotiation, the defendant’s 
desire to plead guilty does not obligate the government to accept a plea. 
However, in the trial context, there are two options, judge or jury, each 
of which must be provided by the government. Because there are only two 
options, waiver in effect creates an affirmative right, that is, obligates the 
government to provide the defendant with a particular thing, here, a bench 
trial. Given the reluctance to find affirmative governmental obligations in 
the constitution, the Singer result is not surprising. The case does not hold 
that having a right does not generally come with the right to waive it, but 
rather that “the ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily 
carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right.”81 In Faretta, 
by contrast, the defendant starts with that rare creature, an affirmative 
constitutional entitlement, and wishes to waive it. Here the waiver does not 
obligate the government to provide the entitlement holder with anything at 
all, and so waiver is allowed by right. 
 
2. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow82 
Both views of the relative value of the two aspects of an entitlement (the 
right to assert it offensively and the right to waive or trade it) can find 
support in two recent Supreme Court cases.83 In an overlooked part of the 
first case, the Court described an entitlement holder’s desire to acquiesce to 
a constitutional violation as a “constitutionally protectable interest” in its 
own right.84 Regrettably, the Court did not expand on this characterization. 
However, a closer look at the facts of the case reveals a microcosm of the 
jointness problem, which the Court resolves by favoring the waiver interest 
over the exercise interest. 
Newdow, whose daughter attends California public schools, brought as 
her next friend an Establishment and Free Exercise challenge against the 
mention of “G-d” in the Pledge of Allegiance recited at school. He claimed 
the girl was, like him, an atheist, and thus put upon by the state-sponsored 
religious reference. The girl’s mother, who had joint custody, intervened to 
argue that the child was actually a Christian who did not mind the Pledge 
and would be harmed if it were repealed.85  
                                                 
81 Singer, 380 U.S. at 28-33. 
82 Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1  (2004). 
83Compare id. with Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 1523-24 (2006).  
84 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 15 n.7 (citation omitted). 
85 Id. at 9. 
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The dispute between Newdow and the mother can be seen as a jus tertii 
question. Various third parties seek to espouse the interests of a principal, 
and it is unclear which advocate, if any, of them truly represents the 
interests of the principal; but it is clear the third-parties claims are 
derivative. Such cases are properly treated as outside the core of the 
standing inquiry. What is interesting here is that the dispute between the 
child’s potential representatives focused not on how to best assert her 
constitutional rights, but rather on whether affirmative assertion or waiver 
had the greatest net benefits.  
In other words, there are two joint owners of the right to espouse the 
child’s claims. One wishes to use that right to challenge a highly colorable 
violation of the child’s constitutional rights (and presumably those of other 
schoolchildren); the other whishes to use the rights by not using them. 
(Unlike other third party standing cases, there is no possibility that the 
principal will eventually resolve the matter directly.) Thus the parents are 
effectively co-owners of the right to bring the Establishment challenge, but 
they disagree on the highest value use of this right.86 Each has veto power 
over the other’s preferred use, and it can not be split down the middle.  
The Court explained its decision in favor of the mother by noting that 
she seemed to have the slight preponderance of custody under state law -- 
though the division of custody is admittedly unclear, and silent on the 
question of legal assertion of rights. A few words in a custody order is an 
extraordinary basis on which to decide a dispute about the highest-value use 
of an entitlement to challenge unconstitutional government action. 
What is particularly noteworthy is what the Court did not do: it could 
have refereed between the two irreconcilable claims by throwing the tie to 
the side that wishes to use the entitlement affirmatively. This is exactly 
what the court of appeals had done below:  
 [The mother] has no power, even as sole legal custodian, 
to insist that her child be subjected to unconstitutional state 
action. Newdow’s assertion of his retained parental rights in 
this case, therefore, simply cannot be legally incompatible 
with any power Banning may hold pursuant to the custody 
order. Further, Ms. Banning may not consent to 
unconstitutional government action in derogation of 
Newdow’s rights or waive Newdow’s right to enforce his 
constitutional interests.87  
  
 Such reasoning finds no expression in the Court’s opinion reversing the 
Ninth Circuit. On the contrary, for the Court, preventing violations of 
                                                 
86 Id. at 15 (“Newdow’s rights . . . cannot be viewed in isolation.”). 
87 Newdow v. United States Congress, 313 F.3d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 2002).  
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constitutional rights (the daughter’s and others) is not an automatic trump 
value. The Court recognized that a party whose constitutional rights are 
being violated may prefer to waive those rights if they think the benefits 
(here, the primary benefit was avoiding social opprobrium) justify it and 
that such a preference is legitimate. Indeed, such a preference may dominate 
a contrary one even when this entails preventing another party from 
exercising their constitutional entitlement.88 
 
3. Georgia v. Randolph89 
The case began with a wife’s domestic violence call. When the police 
asked for permission to search the house, the wife consented – but her 
husband vociferously objected. The Court held that the husband’s veto 
made the search unconstitutional “as to him.” The wife could consent to a 
search of the home, but so long as the husband was there objecting, the 
search could not be applied “to him.” This is an attempt to disaggregated 
the simple overlapping entitlement, and as Justice Scalia shows in his 
dissent, even at this level the cut is sloppy: if the search is valid “as to her,” 
would not the plain sight rule also allow the search to spill over to the drug 
paraphernalia the husband had left out?90 Carving out opt-outs when 
entitlements overlap is not easy.  
Here, two people have overlapping entitlements in the privacy of their 
home. One wishes to trade the entitlement (for a police search), the other to 
use it affirmatively. The Court throws the tie to the affirmative use of the 
entitlement: “In the balancing of competing individual and governmental 
interests entailed by the bar to unreasonable searches the cooperative 
occupant's invitation adds nothing to the government’s side to counter the 
force of an objecting individual's claim to security against the government's 
intrusion into his dwelling place.”91 The Court here treats the affirmative 
use of the right as outweighing the waiver use. However, it does not treat 
the affirmative use as a trump: the affirmative use is explicitly weighed 
against the other side’s various possible interests in consenting, which the 
Court treats quite seriously. The balancing is based partly on a belief that 
the interests of the consenting party could be served through other means 
that do not sacrifice the objector’s right, while the opposite is not true.  
Of course, the Court was dealing with a simple two-party situation, 
                                                 
88 Newdow had also raised constitutional claims in his own name, to the effect that the 
Establishment violation harmed his ability to teach his daughter his religious views. See 
Elk Grove Village at 16-17. This claim also overlapped with the daughter’s Establishment 
clause right, in that its successful exercise would prevent the daughter from acquiescing. 
The Court denied standing for this claim as well without any additional explanation. 
89 126 S.Ct.1515, 1523-24 (2006). 
90 126 S.Ct. at 1536. 
91 Id. at 1523-24. 
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where there is no reason to prefer the consent use to the affirmative use 
(though there were on the facts of the case: the police had come on a 
domestic abuse call from the woman). The balance might look quite 
different with one objector out of ten thousand. After all, Elk Grove Village 
v. Newdow could be thought of as a case about three people with a rights-
interest in a jointed action – Newdow, the daughter, and her mother. Two 
out of three favor waiver, and waiver wins the day. 
 
 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO STANDING: DISAGGREGATING JOINTNESS  
 
This Part considers whether the jointness problem can be better dealt 
with through methods other than standing restrictions. The problem shows 
explains what is at stake in crafting standing doctrine. It does not 
demonstrate that the right response should be to adopt a restrictive standing 
regime. While standing can avert massive social losses and interference 
with people’s exercise of their rights, it is not costless. Standing cuts the 
transaction-cost knot by entirely denying relief to plaintiffs, leaving them 
with uncompensated losses. This downside of standing is purely 
distributional. The second – and socially more important – cost of standing 
involves the merit good component of constitutional rights. To the extent 
that constitutional litigation is a vehicle for the vindication of broader social 
interests, the denial of standing frustrates this goal. For example, it limits 
the production of the public good of precedent regarding permissible 
government conduct.92  
 
A.  Liability Rules  
 The typical judicial remedy for a jointness problem in other contexts 
is not to deny relief but rather to make it monetary rather than injunctive – 
to switch from a property rule to a liability rule. The jointness problem is, as 
has been seen, one of high transaction costs arising from a large number of 
disorganized entitlement holders, and the potential of strategic holdout 
among them. In such situations, Calabresi and Melamed famously found 
that the socially preferable solution would be to switch from the property 
rule protection that generally accompanies private law rights to liability rule 
protection – thus allowing a nonconsensual buy-out of the aggrieved 
parties’ entitlements at a judicially-determined price.93 Generally an 
entitlement is either protected by property rules or liability rules all of the 
                                                 
92 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. 
LEG. STUD. 235, 240 (1979) (identifying precedent as a public good). 
93 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
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time, but when transaction costs change dramatically, a switch in the 
remedial regime would be warranted. Calabresi & Melamed suggested as 
much, and while their theory has had limited effect on the nuisance 
entitlements that they took as their subject, it is descriptive of the legal 
response to such problems in other areas.94 In private law, one sees this in 
minority shareholders’ rights in corporate law,95 and in constitutional law, a 
switch to liability rules can be found in the Takings Clause.96  
 A response along these lines that could be an alternative to standing 
would be to take injunctive relief off the table in jointness situations. One 
might say standing exists only at law, not in equity. The remedy would be 
monetary, the court’s estimation of compensatory damages for the 
plaintiff’s injury. Injunctive relief is binary, while monetary relief is 
continuous. To the extent a court can value a person’s individual stake in a 
de facto joint entitlement; it can effectively separate the entitlement into 
multiple awards of monetary relief.97 
Liability rules would capture many of the benefits of restrictive standing 
while also incorporating some of the advantages of the liberal approach. It 
avoids the potentially massive social losses that arise from property rule 
protection when rights are inalienable. At the same time, unlike the current 
standing doctrine, it does not simply let losses lie where they fall, but rather 
grants some measure of recompense to those aggrieved by the governmental 
action. Perhaps more importantly, it allows the courts to address the merits 
of plaintiffs’ claims, giving them occasion to pronounce on the 
constitutionality of government action. This has expressive,98 
precedential,99 and educational100 benefits that should not be 
                                                 
94 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
5-6 (2002). 
95 See id. at 33-39 (describing appraisal right, essential facilities doctrine, and other 
private law rules as “pliability rules”). 
96 U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.; see Kontorovich, Liability Rules, 56 STANFORD L. REV. at 
__  (describing current and possible constitutional pliability rules). 
97 Professor Fallon has recently noted that standing doctrine seems motivated by 
concern about cost of injunctive remedies, in particular, ongoing supervisory decrees, and 
such concerns would fall away in a damages regime. Fallon, Remedies, supra note _, at 
650-651, 665-66. While the solution may be similar, this is an entirely different remedial 
concern from the one discussed here, which focuses on the inability to buy out an 
inefficient injunction due to transaction costs. 
98 See Amar, supra, at 718 (arguing that law-declaring function of court argues for a 
relaxation of standing restrictions). See generally, Cass Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving 
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 69 (1996) (arguing that decisions of the Court 
“and may well have major social effects just by virtue of their status as communication”). 
99 An existing judicial determination of the issue could be used to get an injunction in 
such subsequent cases where jointness is not a problem. Moreover, establishing precedent 
on constitutional issues has become particularly important given qualified immunity and 
the new standard for federal habeas petitions. See generally, John C. Jeffries, Jr., The 
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underestimated. A determination that the government is acting illegally 
would impose a potentially large shaming penalty on officials. 
 
B.  Problems With Liability Rules 
 
When high transaction costs prevent bargaining, property rules threaten 
to lock in inefficient resource allocations. The (academically) accepted 
solution is to protect the entitlements with liability rules, which allow for 
forced takings at a judicially-determined price. Instead, what standing 
doctrine does when confronted with a jointness problem is to switch from 
the robust property rule default to a rule of zero protection. This section will 
explore the limitations of liability rules as an alternative to standing 
restrictions. These limitations may explain why standing effectively 
eliminates the plaintiff’s entitlement, rather than cashing it out with liability 
rules. One reason may be “injunctive essentialism” -- a mistaken 
assumption that constitutional plaintiffs are always entitled to property rule 
protection. Furthermore, liability rules would create a new set of problems - 
valuing the entitlements and screening out opportunistic plaintiffs - that 
may be as serious as those under property rules.  
 
1. Injunctive essentialism. 
In private law, entitlements can be protected either through liability or 
property rules. Whether an entitlement will be protected with liability or  
property rules often turns on whether transaction costs are high enough to 
block efficient trade.101 The situation is quite different for constitutional 
entitlements, which are thought to require, by their very nature, property 
rule protection.102 Those subject to an ongoing or prospective constitutional 
violation are presumptively entitled to an injunction.103 Nothing in 
constitutional law dictates property rules as the sole protective regime. 
Indeed, constitutional law uses liability rules in a surprising number of 
                                                                                                                            
Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L. J. 87 (1999) (arguing the qualified 
immunity doctrine encourages courts to develop constitutional law deferring the full costs 
of doing so). 
100 Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 961 (1992) 
101 See Calabresi & Melamed.   
102 See CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAYE KANE,  11A 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2944 (“[I]f a constitutional violation is established, 
usually no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary”) (2006); id. at  §  2948.1 n.21 
(collecting cases); Laycock at 57 (“Injunctions are routine in all civil rights and 
constitutional litigation.”) 
103 See Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of 
Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755, 758 (2004) (demonstrating the general belief in a 
near-automatic right to injunctions for constitutional violations). 
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situations generally characterized by high transaction costs.104 And the 
structure of the Bill of Rights suggests liability or property are equally valid 
options when, as is almost always the case, the Constitution specifies only 
the substance of the entitlement but not the remedial regime.105  
Nonetheless, there is a belief among judges and scholars that liability rules 
for constitutional rights are inappropriate and perhaps unconstitutional 
(aside, of course, form the Takings context). 
 
2. Valuation difficulties. 
Accurately appraising the plaintiff’s loss is always a problem with 
liability rules, which replace a market mechanism for determining price 
with a governmental one. The severity of the problem depends on the nature 
of the entitlement in question. When an entitlement is not traded in thick 
markets or has elements of idiosyncratic value, accurate judicial valuation 
becomes more difficult.. The difficulty manifests in both decision costs 
(such as legal fees, judicial salaries, and discovery) and error costs (the 
incorrect incentives created through inaccurate valuations). The wide use of 
property rules in private law is due, in part, to a belief that valuation 
difficulties are so ubiquitous and intractable that legal remedies are never 
adequate.106 
Yet juries do assign values to even the most inchoate injuries, such as  
extreme emotional distress and loss of consortium. Such damages are 
controversial, and may be systematically wrong; certainly one is more 
skeptical of them than damages for economic loss, which helps explain 
restrictions on the recovery for non-pecuniary injuries. Juries are often 
asked to put a price on constitutional entitlements, as when they award 
damages to victims of illegal seizures, police brutality or malicious 
governmental discrimination. These awards are made only because it is too 
late for anticipatory relief, but it bears noting that the law does not regard 
the valuation of these entitlements as being a task beyond the competence 
of courts.  
To be sure, constitutional entitlements are, on the whole, harder to value 
than private law entitlements,107 and the inchoate rights typically at issue in 
                                                 
104 See Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost 
Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, 91 U. VA. L. REV. 1135 (2005) (showing how liability 
rules are used in the prior restraint doctrine, Eighth Amendment Bail Clause, procedural 
due process, Fourth Amendment search and seizure rules, and the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination). 
105 Id. at 1165-69. 
106 See Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 
(1993) (arguing that equitable relief is the norm in much broader area of private law than 
generally appreciated). 
107 See Kontorovich, Two Dimensions, at 1147-48 (discussing valuation difficulties 
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standing problems will be particularly troublesome. What is less clear is 
whether constitutional entitlements pose any greater valuation problems 
than the inchoate entitlements in common law. The correct measure of 
damages is how much the plaintiff would demand to be paid to suffer the 
injury, and it is hard to see why this is more speculative when the injury is 
an establishment of religion rather than intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  
Concerns about valuation difficulties are often put in terms of whether a 
damages award will capture the “full” cost of the harm – that is, the 
assumption is often that error will be systematically biased towards under-
compensation. (Error is only a social problem if it is systematically biased 
one way or another.) Injunctive essentialism is partly based on the view that 
money will not make the plaintiff whole. It seems the opposite could also be 
true; it is actually a difficult empirical question. One can imagine a rejected 
applicant challenging an affirmative action program. Had someone 
approached him before he applied, he may have accepted a modest sum to 
take his chances under the program; a damage award, made in hindsight 
could be much larger. 
On the other hand, the role of the jury may raise a particular problem in 
hard standing cases, where the great majority of entitlement holders assign a 
zero or negative value to exercising the entitlement. Here a judge could not 
charge a jury to award damages based on how much they would need to be 
paid to suffer the same injury (a common way of getting at non-pecuniary 
damages) because most would  suffer it gladly.108  
 
 
3. Free riders. 
Valuation problems are not unique to the jointness problem; a more 
particular problem with liability rules in this context involves distinguishing 
those genuinely aggrieved by the governmental action (those that, unlike the 
majority, place a positive value on their entitlement) from possible 
pretenders. With the kind of entitlements and injuries that hard standing 
cases involve, the only observable difference between these two classes is 
that the former comes forth to litigate. Ideology (broadly understood as 
beliefs, politics, religions, appraisal of risks, temperament, concern or some 
similar subjective disposition) is all that separates the ideological or public 
interest plaintiff (or any plaintiff in a situation where many are harmed but 
                                                                                                                            
with constitutional rights). 
108 See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of A (Misunderstood) 
Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771 (2003) (noting that since judges are themselves 
taxpayers, one might think that they would have all have a conflict of interest in presiding 
over a taxpayer standing suit). 
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few sue) from everyone else. The problem for liability rules is that such 
internal states are easy to fake or opportunistically adopt.  
 Imagine in Richardson a liability rule substituting for the standing 
jurisdictional bar. The case would proceeds to the merits, where the 
plaintiff wins. Instead of enjoining the CIA to reveal its accounts, the court 
would remedy Richardson’s injury by awarding him $1,000. Under the 
theory behind the liability rule, all other positive value entitlement holders 
should be able to recover as well. Unless the full cost to the positive-value 
people is internalized, there is no assurance that the government’s policy 
has a net social benefit.109 
However, once the first plaintiffs win their case, it becomes difficult to 
determine who the positive-value people are. At this point, anyone claiming 
that they are aggrieved by the CIA’s nondisclosure could come forth and, 
relying on Richardson as a precedent, claim $1,000 for themselves. 
Assuming a unified and indivisible course of government conduct – which 
this Article treats as the predicate for standing problems –  once the first 
award is made, every American willing to profess the views of the original 
plaintiff, at least in a complaint, can be interchangeably plugged in as a 
subsequent plaintiff. The Supreme Court greatly mitigated this problem 
when it held the new doctrine of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel110 
inapplicable to suits against the United States.111 But this merely changes 
the problem from one of collateral estoppel to one of stare decisis.112  
Nonetheless, winnowing out insincere plaintiffs would be a difficult 
task, requiring an individualized inquiry into the subjective beliefs of each 
plaintiff. For most there would be no evidence apart from their own 
testimony. Even for those where evidence could be had of a contrary prior 
disposition, it would be difficult to use this to block relief, for that would 
result, quite oddly, in less constitutional protection for people who change 
their minds than for those of long-established views.  
The key point is that given the nature of the protected entitlement, it 
                                                 
109 The discussion here holds to one side questions about the extent to which the 
government internalizes costs. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, 
Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000). It also 
assumes the government acts as an agent for society at large rather than pursuing its own 
agenda. Clearly if internalization and agency are problematic, it weakens the analysis of the 
Article, along with much of the rest of constitutional theory. 
110 This is the practice where a subsequent plaintiff uses the victory of a prior plaintiff 
against a common defendant to conclusively establish facts or issues common to both 
cases. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
111 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984). 
112 If the first suit was resolved by the Supreme Court, the effect on subsequent 
litigation would be the same. Otherwise, the free-rider problem would be reduced as free-
riding would only be possible within circuits where plaintiffs had won. 
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would be very difficult to distinguish sincere plaintiffs from the 
opportunistic ones, who would have waived (or even paid to not exercise) 
their entitlement under a property rule. If enough negative-value entitlement 
holders take advantage of a prior judgment to receive damages, the cost of 
compensation could exceed the social benefit of the government action, and 
the liability rule cure would be worse than the property rule disease. 
 
C.  Making Liability Rules Work 
 
In situations where the standing doctrine is currently used to bar suits 
for lack of an “injury-in-fact,” it might be preferable to recognize standing 
but to use liability rules rather than property rules. A major problem with 
this is separating sincere plaintiffs from opportunistic ones; the first subpart 
below considers a possible solution. Correctly valuing the entitlements is 
another problem; the second section below considers an important standing  
situation where valuation difficulties seem tractable.  
 
1. Liability rule with an event-based statute of limitations.  
A better solution would be to switch to liability rules while limiting the 
preclusive effect of the first favorable judgment. The best way to do this 
would be with a statute of limitations that expires when a favorable 
judgment becomes final after appeal in whatever case first reaches that 
mark. In other words, to get within the limitations period one would have to 
file before any favorable appellate judgment in any of the other suits on the 
matter becomes final. (Since all potential plaintiffs are injured by the same 
course of government conduct, the clock would start running for everyone 
at the same time; in cases where this may not be true, tolling would of 
course be appropriate.) The statute of limitations would cut out concern 
about stare decisis free-riding because the limitations period would end the 
moment that res judicata effect would begin.113 At the same time, this 
would allow an indefinite number of genuinely aggrieved plaintiffs to 
receive compensation by filing early. Presumably it is the ideological 
plaintiffs, those with the greater injury, who will file first, and thus 
compensation will roughly track injury. Thus this solution also acts as a 
filter between sincere and strategic plaintiffs.  
 
2. Taxpayer remedies for taxpayer standing. 
The valuation difficulties caused by liability rules may be easiest to deal 
with in taxpayer suits, which have long been a major source of standing 
                                                 
113 In a similar but narrower vein, Prof. Brilmayer has suggested eliminating the stare 
decisis and collateral estoppel effect of judgments adverse to the plaintiff of questionable 
standing as an alternative to the standing doctrine. See Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. at 309. 
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controversies.114 Taxpayer suits are seen as the paradigm of generalized 
grievances.115 Taxpayer suits challenge the legality of governmental 
spending; the invocation of the plaintiffs’ status as taxpayers ostensibly 
distinguishes their interest in the matter from a purely abstract or altruistic 
one, from a mere citizen’s interest. Striking down the challenged program 
would reduce total expenditures and ultimately bring a reduction in taxes. 
Thus the theory behind taxpayer suits seeks to connect something that looks 
like pure citizen standing to the most traditional of injuries, economic harm. 
The Court has had little truck with this theory. If a program is struck down, 
the government would most likely find something else to spend the money 
on, rather than refund it – thus the element of “redressability” is missing. 
With massive deficit spending, there is even less connection between being 
a present-day taxpayer and financing of current government operations.  
Moreover, the Court recognizes that taxpayer standing cannot be 
understood as anything other than a fiction116 to disguise what is at bottom a 
citizen or private attorney general suit. Almost everyone pays taxes, and 
thus the plaintiff’s interest is indistinguishable from those of many 
others;117 and all government actions involve money either obtained through 
taxation, or fungible with it. Thus federal taxpayer status has been 
consistently rejected as a basis for standing despite ongoing attempts to 
assert it,118 with the important exception of Establishment Clause suits 
challenging Congressional spending programs.119 
 Understanding the problems to which standing responds – problems 
caused by overlapping and thus inalienable rights regarding a single course 
of conduct – gives a new perspective on the taxpayer suits. The problem 
with these suits is not the lack of injury or redressability, but the remedy 
sought. Though they base their standing on a purely economic injury, the 
taxpayer suits do not seek monetary relief but rather to enjoin the spending 
program.120 If their interest in the legality of the program stems from their 
status as taxpayers, then the relief they seek is overbroad; nothing about 
being a taxpayer should entitle them to question how their funds and those 
of others are being spent.  
If the program is unitary in the sense that opt-outs cannot be excluded, 
                                                 
114 See Frothigham. 
115 TRIBE at s.3-17 pg. 421. 
116 TRIBE at s.3-17 pg. 421. 
117 Frothingham. 
118 See Staudt, Taxpayers in Court, 52 EMORY L.J. 771 (showing that federal courts bar 
federal taxpayer standing but may permit municipal taxpayer standing). 
119 See Flast v. Cohen.  
120 See Staudt, Taxpayers, at 776 (“The goal of the lawsuit is to halt government 
spending or, in the alternative, to re-fashion it to ensure the spending projects comport with 
existing statutory or constitutional norms.”). 
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an injunction raises the problems discussed in Part II. However, the 
taxpayer theory, and the objection to spending on the program, shows how 
the unitary program can be disaggregated. If the remedy is at law – a refund 
of the plaintiff’s pro-rated contribution to the program – then one plaintiff’s 
disposition of her entitlement would not affect other potential plaintiffs’ 
disposition of theirs. While action may be unitary, money is infinitely 
divisible.  
All of the problems with a liability rule solution seem easier with a 
taxpayer suit. Damages are easy to calculate – the cost of the program 
multiplied by the plaintiff’s fractional share of the national tax revenue. 
Injunctive essentialism seems at its weakest here, where the plaintiff 
complains of an essentially economic injury. The liability rule answers the 
redressability concern that hangs over taxpayer suits by ensuring that the 
plaintiff benefits from winning the suit. (To be sure, for most taxpayers and 
most spending programs, the individual’s share would be minute enough 
that they would be dwarfed by the costs of litigation, and even by the 
administrative costs of distributing the damages.) On the other hand, this 
solution shares the weakness of liability rules as a response to jointness -- it 
does nothing to address free-rider problems. However, those could be dealt 
with through the kind of statute of limitations discussed in the previous 
subsection. 
 
D.  Disaggregation with Property Rules  
 
The problem to which standing responds can be managed to some extent 
even under a property rule system. To alternatives are discussed. The first 
focuses simply on narrowing the scope of injunctions; this would represent 
the most modest reform discussed in this Article. However, it cannot be 
applied to all or perhaps even most types of government action, thus greatly 
limiting its utility. Furthermore, it may reduce the magnitude or probability 
of jointness problems but not enough to make a difference. Still, if one finds 
the costs of robust standing unacceptable, this proposal will be a practical 
and almost costless alternative in that it does not seek to limit plaintiff’s 
standing at all, but only the scope of injunctive relief. The second 
alternative is more innovative, and would probably require legislative 
implementation. But it might serve the goals of standing better than either 
current doctrine or the alternatives discussed here. 
 
1. Narrowing injunctions.  
As has been seen, a key feature of the standing problem is a single 
government action that infringes on the entitlements of many people, rather 
than many independent actions directed at many people. The indivisibility 
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of the action creates the holdout problem. Its applicability to many people 
makes it difficult to have alienability of the entitlements to be free of the 
action. However, whether an action or program is truly unitary is not always 
clear, and in some way is a function of other aspects of the law, in 
particular, the choice of remedial regime.  
To the extent law can disaggregate governmental actions into smaller 
parcels, along geographic or other lines, the problem that standing seeks to 
address diminishes. The inauguration case discussed in Part II.B.2 is a clear 
example of a completely unitary action with nationwide scope. But consider 
another suit by Newdow, where he challenged the recitation of the pledge of 
allegiance in schools on Establishment Clause grounds. The recitation of the 
pledge is geographically divisible. It can be recited in some judicial circuits 
but not others, in some school districts but not others, even in some class 
rooms in a particular school but not in others.  
Such disaggregation can be implemented simply by issuing narrow 
injunctions. Indeed, the narrower the remedy is on the back end, the less the 
need for narrow standing on the front end. If one can only challenge the 
recitation of the pledge in one’s own classroom, the problems that standing 
responds to greatly diminish. For one, the class of potential plaintiffs in 
each classroom would be small, definite (knowable in advance) and difficult 
to manipulate. This would make bargaining among the people with different 
valuations easier. By contrast, if the question is the Pledge nationally, the 
class of potential plaintiffs is vast, difficult to identify, and manipulable.    
This is not so different from what courts do when applying the standing 
doctrine in Establishment Clause. In cases challenging religious displays or 
symbols, standing is often limited to those with some “personal connection” 
or geographic nexus to the display, such as those who routinely see it, 
“usually in the[ir] home or community.”121 Similarly, a plaintiff challenging 
his local religious display should presumably not have standing to challenge 
that of a far-off town, even if set up as part of the same program.  
The “personal  connection” test serves the transaction costs purposes of 
standing limitations very poorly, because while it may reduce the number of 
people with standing, it still leaves class membership undefined and 
completely open.122 A potential plaintiff can easily acquire a “personal 
connection” by slightly changing his routine to occasionally pass by the 
display. The potential for the class to expand in this way makes settlement 
with known members futile, and holdout easy. When looking for axes along 
which an action can be divided, the key is to create discrete groups of 
                                                 
121 Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp.2d. at 278. 
122 The same can be said of the nexus requirements imposed on plaintiffs in statutory 
rights cases like Lujan. These requirements have been widely ridiculed as artificial by 
critics of standing. 
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potential plaintiffs corresponding to each unit. Thus it is important to try to 
carve out discrete plaintiff groups whose membership is defined ex ante, 
identifiable, and closed.  
To be sure, the idea that injunctions should be narrowly cast is an old 
maxim of equity. Yet it seems forgotten in cases of broad public concern, 
for obvious reason – if the pledge is unconstitutional why not ban it 
everywhere? The answer suggested here is because people everywhere are 
not complaining, and a remedial zealousness would lead to jointness 
problems. 
 
2. Random standing.  
Perhaps the best way of realizing the efficiency goals of standing 
without the downsides of the current doctrine would be a system of random 
standing. Standing to litigate a given injury would be given to – and 
confined to – a representative sample of the allegedly injured population. 
The system would be triggered by the court concluding that a suit before it 
raised a standing problem as defined in Part II – a government program that 
infringes on many peoples rights in a similar or identical fashion. If the 
disaggregation solution suggested above did not seem feasible, the court 
would send notice to representative sample of the affected class. The notice 
would inform them of the alleged rights violation, and that they were one of 
a certain number of people given standing to pursue equitable remedies 
against the violation. The sample group would be chosen using methods 
such as those used by polling agencies; it should be just large enough to be 
statistically representative. The expenses and administration of the sampling 
would be, at least originally, borne by the original plaintiff and her 
attorneys – the system is essentially that of class action notification, except 
seeking opt-ins, not opt outs. 
Anyone in the sample group could, if they wished, sue to redress the 
constitutional violation. If even a single one of them chose to do so, they 
would have standing per se; the Court would not be able to say their injury 
was too abstract or general. However, if none of the random group chose to 
challenge the government program, no one else could so.  
 The random system has many advantages. Unlike current standing 
doctrine, it would never result in a system where no one has standing to 
challenge a constitutional violation that affects many. At the same time, the 
class of potential plaintiffs would be small, closed and identifiable – indeed, 
the names of group members should be shared with the defendant to 
facilitate bargaining. This would prevent some of the most severe 
inefficiencies that could result from a liberal standing regime.  
One of the greatest difficulties for standing’s efficiency function is that 
it depends on the Court making ad hoc and poorly informed judgment about 
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the relative proportion of positive and negative value rights holders. The 
existence of one plaintiff out of 300 million potential ones says very little. 
However, one out of a few thousand would suggest the negative value rights 
holders are numerous enough that despite their being a minority, they still 
might be the highest value users of the right.  
Random standing would go a long way to solving the problems of 
jointness by creating a manageably small, closed and identifiable class of 
rights-holders. It would not entirely solve the problem; the possibility of 
holdout would remain. That is, because any one individual among the 
sample group can hold hostage the entire social surplus (assuming it exists), 
the incentive for such strategic behavior will remain. The probability of 
holdout preventing an efficient solution decreases with the number of 
potential veto-holders, but with any group large enough to be meaningfully 
representative, holdout may be a possibility.  
 
E.  Summary. 
 
The discussion of alternative methods of avoiding the welfare losses 
caused by jointness help explain why it is in reality addressed by the 
ungainly injury-in-fact standing doctrine. Alternative methods of avoiding 
the welfare losses caused by jointness appear unattractive, inadequate or 
impractical. Liability rules recapitulate many of the problems seen under 
property rules. Random standing may get better results, though it only 
reduces, rather than eliminates the holdout problem. However, it is 
exceedingly unlikely that random standing would ever be implemented by 
Congress: making the vindication of constitutional rights explicitly depend 
on fortuity cannot be politically attractive. As for the narrow injunctions 
approach, it is easy enough to implement in situations where divisions can 
be made along geographic lines, but altogether impossible to implement in 
other important contexts, like Richardson, or the Inauguration case. 
Liability rules with a statute-of-limitations to screen out insincere plaintiffs 
may be the best answer, but would almost certainly require some legislative 
authorization. But while arguments can be made for the constitutionality of 
confining constitutional plaintiffs to legal remedies,123 they go against the 
grain – as does an event-based, rather than a time-based statute of 
limitations. Not surprisingly, Congress has not arrived at a solution that 
would involve a combination of two such unusual and controversial 
features.     
 
                                                 
123 See Kontorovich, Two Dimensions; Kontorovich, Mass Detentions.  
50 STANDING  [27-Mar-07 
V. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS  
 
This Part will consider some miscellaneous implications of the account 
of standing elaborated above.  
 
A.  Non-Hoehfeldian plaintiffs. 
Denials of standing usually involve non-Hoehfeldian plaintiffs, that is, 
plaintiffs whose are not seeking redress for a violation of their personal, 
common law rights. Some argue that this is because judges invented the 
doctrine to obstruct the exercise of the new “public rights.”124 The role of 
standing described in this Article suggests another explanation (though of 
course it does not exclude sloppy or politically-motivated judging). First, 
the amorphous and abstract nature of non-Hoehfeldian interests makes it 
likely that they will be widely held, and that it will be difficult to identify 
injured entitlement holders ex ante. Second, the abstract nature of the injury 
makes it easy to simulate, and thus prevents the plaintiff group from every 
truly being closed, thereby preventing efficient settlement. Jointness 
problems arise more frequently with non-Hoehfeldian or public rights, but 
they are not limited to them.   
Thus one would expect to see fewer standing problems where 
constitutional rights track common law rights than where they do not. 
Common law entitlements were generally defined in such a way as to avoid 
overlapping rights. Thus one can predict that as the law moves away from 
using the common law definition of property and towards “expectation of 
privacy” to define the scope of protection under Fourth Amendment, 
standing problems will become more common. Standing problems will be 
most frequent under the structural provisions of the Constitution and the 
Establishment Clause because actions that violate them necessarily affect 
many people in the same way.125 
  
B.  Equal Protection 
 
When the rights of some are violated but the same rights of others 
similarly situated are protected, the account of standing presented in Parts II 
and III does not apply. A defining feature of jointness is that the 
government action affects a broad class of people who have an entitlement 
to be free of it. It is not a situation where a majority countenances the 
infringement of the rights of a minority, but rather where the rights of all 
members of the class are infringed, and the only possible difference among 
class members is how much they would pay to be free of the infringement. 
                                                 
124 See, e.g., Sunstein; Jaffe. 
125 See Redish, Political Order at 103. 
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One protection against abuse is that all must have their rights on the line.   
Yet the gist of the equal protection claim is that basis by which the class 
of affected people was defined was in itself illegitimate. So it would be odd 
to deny standing on injury-in-fact grounds for an Equal Protection claim.126 
Equal protection violations involve singling out a particular class for 
inferior treatment; and singling out is the antithesis of jointness, for the 
singled-out class is presumably limited and defined.127 
 
C.  Class actions. 
Standing determinations involve some of the same considerations as 
class certification.128 Both involve efforts by one party to get an 
adjudication of widely-held rights. The points developed above suggest that 
liberal standing would result in a dysfunctional version of the class action 
without any of its safeguards. Broad standing makes everyone a member of 
what can be a nationwide plaintiff “class.” As with class actions, a question 
arises as to who can determine what a fair settlement is. In a class action, 
the class is represented by unitary counsel; the defendant knows that settling 
with the named representative’s counsel will transfer all of the class 
members’ entitlements. Because this is a significant power, both named 
plaintiff and counsel achieve representative status only after demonstrating 
their fitness to the court.  
Broad standing is like a class action where, in effect, no one can settle 
the class’s claims. Unlike in a formal class action, those with different 
preferences cannot opt out. A minority can effectively dictate the remedies 
for the entire class, who might prefer something entirely different.129 One 
person can bring the entire “class” to litigation while all other members 
would benefit from settlement. 
 In the class action process, the party that determines the disposition of 
the class’s entitlements must have interests closely approximating those of 
all other class members. With broad standing, there are no such guarantees, 
                                                 
126 But see Allen v. Wright. 
127 One could imagine the opposite problem – what might called “intentional 
jointness,” where the government broadens the scope of a constitutionally dubious action to 
include a great number of people specifically to create sanding difficulties. It is not clear if 
such a thing has even happened. If the government ceases a challenged action to evade 
review, courts will entertain a challenge despite its mootness. Presumably they could take 
the same approach to intentional jointness. 
128 See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 216 (noting analogy between standing to assert broadly 
held rights and class representative status); Epstein; Scott; Jensen, et al.; Redish; 
Brilmayer, “Case or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. at 307-09. 
129 Thus the representation problem in class actions arises not just because the absent 
class members will be bound by the collateral estoppel effect of the judgment, as Prof. 
Brilmayer has suggested, but because of the immediate effect of the judgment, assuming 
injunctive relief is sought. See Brilmayer, Perspectives at 308.    
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and the plaintiff may have interests diametrically opposed to the rest of the 
group whose rights are affected.130 When the plaintiff is a poor 
representative, or there are cleavages within the proposed class, the proper 
course is to deny certification and allow the suits to proceed individually, or 
to certify subclasses. Yet jointness prevents such disaggregation. The court 
must then choose whose valuation of the right will prevail. Such a decision 
is unavoidable when conflicting claims are made to a common resource. 
Sometimes denying standing means no one can bring a case at all; but this 
is little different from denying certification on grounds of heterogeneity to a 
purported class whose members individually all have negative value claims. 
In short, liberal standing would allow for a kind of class action that 
cannot be settled by the plaintiff, cannot be opted-out of by absent class 
members, and where the plaintiff may have interests that sharply conflict 
with those of the class – a class action with few of the protections of the 
Rule 23 regime and less advantages.  
 
D.  Statutory rights. 
The discussion has thus far focused on entitlements created by the 
Constitution. Yet standing issues can arise regardless of the source of the 
substantive law. Indeed, much of the criticism of the Court’s standing 
jurisprudence has come in response to cases where the government is sued 
for purely statutory violations, most commonly in the context of regulatory 
action.131 As a positive matter, the analysis of standing’s consequences for 
statutory rights is much the same as for constitutional ones. However, it 
may have different normative implications for statutory rights.132 
Both the inalienability and holdout problems discussed in Part II arise 
regardless of the source of the underlying entitlement. Broader standing 
increases the likelihood of inefficient outcomes. Even if, as Prof. Sunstein 
                                                 
130 The situation is analogous to smoking or asbestos-exposure class actions that seek 
to simultaneously espouse the claims of dead, symptomatic, and asymptomatic individuals. 
While all have suffered the same legal injury, the vast difference in the degree and nature 
of their harm may make symptomatic plaintiffs poor representatives of asymptomatic ones. 
Indeed, they may have opposing interests, with one side favoring a cash judgment that 
would ruin the defendant but would provide immediate relief, while others favor the 
establishment of a trust that would only pay out a small portion of its assets in the present 
period but ensure that the defendant company would be around to pay medical expenses 
that arise ten years later. 
131 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988) (arguing that applying standing limitations, which are based 
on common-law concepts of injury, to administrative action improperly constitutionalizes 
common law notions of injury). 
132 See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 S. CT. REV. 37, 60 (suggesting that 
injury-in-fact requirements may be proper in constitutional cases on constitutional 
avoidance grounds).  
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points out, regulatory injuries by their nature affect a broader class of 
people than common law ones, this does nothing to reduce transaction costs 
that arise when a large and amorphous class of people have standing. When 
transaction costs are high, so long as a governmental program causes some 
prohibited harm, it can be blocked regardless of its net benefits.133 
However, this subpart will suggest this is a weaker justification for standing 
limitations for statutory rights than constitutional ones.  
Constitutional entitlements, in contrast, are cut from a uniform cloth. 
Everyone has them in equal amounts.134 It is in the nature of American 
individual rights that they protect all individuals;135 structural provisions 
organize the government that governs everyone. If one wanted to limit the 
exercise of such entitlements in certain unusual circumstances  
characterized by high transaction costs, it would be difficult to incorporate 
such a limitation into the definition of the right. However, a natural way to 
do it would be to build in jurisdictional flexibility and one can imagine the 
“cases or controversies” limitation filling this role.  
Proponents of the “cause-of-action” theory of standing would argue that 
this general availability of constitutional entitlements itself represents a 
constitutional determination about standing, namely, that it should be broad. 
There are several responses to this point. First, on a doctrinal level, both the 
distribution of entitlements and the “case or controversy” limitation spring 
from the same document. There is no a priori reason to think that the 
distribution of entitlements represents a complete judgment about what 
constitutes a “case or controversy.” Instead, “case or controversy” may be a 
judgment about the acceptable conditions for the exercise of entitlements 
created elsewhere. Unless one believes (or believe the Framers believed) 
that the correct level of constitutional violations is strictly zero in all 
situations, there is no reason to think that the creation and allocation of 
constitutional rights, unmitigated by a standing barrier in jointness 
situations, represents the only and last word on when rights can be asserted.  
This is not always the case for statutory rights. Unlike constitutional 
entitlements, statutory and regulatory entitlements are made-to-order by 
Congress. They are often nuanced and detailed. Congress to bestow rights 
                                                 
133 This assumes the illegal feature of the program is integral to it, so that that 
enjoining the harm effectively blocks the entire program.  
134 See COOTER, STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION at 249 (describing the “equality constraint”  
on constitutional rights, under which “one person’s liberty cannot change without the same 
change in everyone’s liberty”). 
135 This is truer after the Reconstruction Amendments. Many questions remain about 
the availability of constitutional rights to foreigners abroad. Compare J. Andrew Kent, A 
Textual Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L. J.  __ (2007), with Kal Raustiala, 
The Geography of Justice, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2501 (2005); Jules Lobel, The Constitution 
Abroad, 83 AM. J. INT’L. L. 871 (1989). 
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of action only on particular types of parties, can condition their exercise in a 
variety of highly particular ways, and in short, set up highly reticulated 
mechanisms for the enforcement and exercise of rights that it creates. 
Congress can create an entitlement and vest its enforcement only in the 
Executive, or in certain groups, or in everyone.  
Thus when Congress broadly extends statutory rights, it suggests a 
deliberate choice to allow a potential minority of dissenters to determine the 
ultimate use of the right. A citizen-suit provision suggests that Congress 
regards the proper level of violation to be zero. This is because when 
Congress creates regulatory rights, the enforcement scheme can be matched 
with the right with a great degree of specificity. 
Part III showed that standing protects the exercise of rights by people 
other than the plaintiff. This is because almost all constitutional entitlements 
can be waived or traded for something of greater value: they are 
presumptively waivable. This need not be the case with statutory rights. 
Congress can tailor rights so as to not have a “flip side.” For example, an 
entitlement can just be given to people “adversely affected” by the 
government action; in which case there is no “negative entitlement” for 
others to trade and thus no autonomy problem. 
Liberal standing can result in significant social losses in situations of 
jointness. Congress can choose to adopt inefficient statutes – there is no 
social surplus maximization principle constraining it. But Congress can 
make these choices – and unmake them – one statute at a time. It can create 
some rights that would be unconstrained by social welfare concerns and 
others that are. Because of the uniform nature of constitutional rights, their 
silence as to remedies, and the extraordinary difficulty of amending it, one 
should be more hesitant to adopt a interpretation of the Constitution that 
would periodically result in large social losses. Thus it makes more sense to 
think that the Constitution contains a built-in safety-net against such 
problems than it does to think statutes are limited by an Art. III injury 
requirement. And indeed, the Court seems to take a more liberal view of the 





Standing is a pragmatic response to a real and potentially serious 
                                                 
136 See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 1 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 
2.13(f)(2) (3d ed. 2006); Logan at 48-49. For an example of how standing can be denied 
for the same type of injury when brought as a constitutional claim but granted in a suit 
pursuant to a statute authorizing action by “any person,” compare Richardson with Akins 
vs. FEC. 
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problem. It is not an ideal response. Purely legal relief would be preferable 
to a jurisdictional dismissal on a variety of grounds, both instrumental and 
“equitable.” However, liability rules may not be a realistic option for both 
doctrinal and functional reasons. There may be ways around the liability 
rule problem, and there are entirely different types of solutions, such as 
random standing. But these are not avenues the legal system is likely to 
explore. Taking these alternatives off the table, the Court must choose 
between the default property rule paradigm and pure condemnation of the 
relevant entitlement. A former could lead to massive social losses; losses 
created not by the perverse preferences or illegitimate tastes of the majority, 
but out of the transaction cost structure of the situation, one in which the 
government would need unanimous consent to carry out a particular policy. 
In a larger group unanimity is impossible, but 99% is certainly impressive 
and may suggest that the majority of rights holders would prefer to buy out 
any dissenting plaintiffs, but cannot do so simply because of the transaction 
costs. Standing allows the Court to ignore the difference between 99% and 
100% in situations where transaction costs prevent the 99% from securing 
the consent of the minority. Thus standing becomes a “second-best” 
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